Bradford, J.
During the early morning hours on April 10, 2013, Appellant-Defendant Dee Ward repeatedly struck J.M. with a leather belt, causing J.M. to suffer extreme pain and serious bruising from her waist to her ankles. J.M.’s mother and step-father called 911 upon discovering J.M.’s injuries immediately after Ward dropped J.M. off at their home. The medical personnel who treated J.M. observed the severity of J.M.’s injuries. In the course of receiving treatment, J.M. indicated to the treating paramedic and emergency room forensic nurse that her injuries were caused by Ward. Ward was subsequently charged with and convicted of Class C felony battery and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.
On appeal, Ward contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting J.M.’s identification of him as the attacker through the testimony of the treating paramedic and forensic nurse. . . . .
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On July 30, 2013, Ward filed a motion to exclude the testimony of J.M. because J.M. failed to appear for a scheduled deposition. On August 6, 2013, the State responded to Ward’s motion, stating that Ward’s motion should be denied because J.M. was classified as a missing person and therefore did not have notice of the scheduled deposition. The trial court denied Ward’s motion on or about August 13, 2013.
On September 13, 2013, the State provided notice of its intent to introduce J.M.’s statements regarding the identity of her attacker through the testimony of the medical personnel who treated J.M., including paramedic Hodge-McKinney and forensic nurse Morrison. Following a hearing on the State’s request, the trial court granted the State permission to introduce J.M.’s statements regarding the identity of her attacker through the testimony of paramedic Hodge-McKinney and forensic nurse Morrison.
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The facts of the instant matter provide that when paramedic Hodge-McKinney initiated her treatment of J.M., J.M. was in her mother and step-father’s home. According to paramedic Hodge-McKinney, it is important for a paramedic who treats a victim who has suffered physical injury to identify the cause of the injuries, including the attacker, because the paramedic needs to establish that the victim is safe. In the instant matter, it seems reasonable that paramedic Hodge-McKinney would be concerned about the identity of J.M.’s attacker while providing treatment to J.M. at her mother and step-father’s home prior to transporting J.M. to the hospital. This is especially true as the identity could potentially impact both paramedic Hodge-McKinney’s and J.M.’s safety if either J.M.’s mother or step-father were the party responsible for J.M.’s injuries.
The identity of the attacker can also reasonably be considered to be important to forensic nurse Morrison’s treatment of J.M. Specifically, forensic nurse Morrison testified at trial that when treating abuse cases, it is “critically important” to determine who attacked a patient because after making sure that the patient is stabilized, “a large part of the forensic nurse[’]s job is to collaborate with social work and the patient in order to ensure [a] safety plan for that person if they are well enough to be discharged.” Tr. pp. 235, 234. Forensic nurse Morrison explained that the safety plan would be much different for a patient attacked by a stranger than a patient attacked by someone with whom they have an ongoing relationship. Forensic nurse Morrison also explained that it is important to determine the identity of the attacker in order to assess the patient’s psychological and emotional state, which can have a substantial impact on the patient’s ability to care for herself following discharge.
In light of the above-stated facts, we conclude that . . . the totality of the circumstances, viewed objectively, indicate that the primary purposes of the examinations of J.M. by paramedic Hodge-McKinney and forensic nurse Morrison, during which J.M. made the challenged statements regarding the identity of her attacker, were to furnish emergency medical care to J.M. As such, J.M.’s statements were not testimonial. Because J.M.’s statements were not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause does not apply. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.