Bradford, J.
Appellee-Defendant Chase R. Downey was arrested after guns, marijuana, and a large sum of cash were discovered during a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. At the time of the stop, Downey indicated that the cash belonged to him. The cash was seized at the time of his arrest. On August 23, 2011, Downey was charged in Division One of the Clark County Circuit Court (the “Division One Circuit Court”) with Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Class C felony carrying a handgun without a license, and Class D felony possession of marijuana. On September 16, 2011, the funds seized from Downey were transferred to the federal government pursuant to a transfer order that was issued by the trial judge presiding over Division Three of the Clark County Superior Court (the “Division Three Superior Court”). [Footnote omitted.]
Downey filed several requests in the Division One Circuit Court to have the seized funds returned to him before filing a motion to set aside the transfer order on July 27, 2013. The Division One Circuit Court subsequently granted Downey’s petition to set aside the transfer order and instructed Appellant-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) to return the seized funds to Downey. On appeal, the State contends that the Division One Circuit Court abused its discretion in setting aside an order of the Division Three Superior Court, a separate court of equal jurisdiction. Concluding that the Division One Circuit Court abused its discretion in setting aside the transfer order, we reverse the judgment of the Division One Circuit Court.
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On September 16, 2011, Indiana State Police Detective David Mitchell requested that the Clark County Prosecutor’s Office file a motion to transfer $8765.00 seized from Downey to the federal government. Upon receiving a signed motion from the Prosecutor’s Office, Detective Mitchell went to the Clark County Clerk’s Office and filed the motion. The motion was filed in the Division Three Superior Court under Cause Number 10C03-1109-MC-755 (“Cause No. MC-755”). Also on September 16, 2011, the Division Three Superior Court issued an order granting the motion to transfer without conducting a hearing. Pursuant to the transfer order, $8765.00 in seized funds were transferred to the federal government and later deemed forfeited following federal forfeiture proceedings.
Beginning in November of 2012, Downey filed legal documents in the Division One Circuit Court requesting the return of the $8765.00 which was seized at the time of his arrest. On July 27, 2013, after realizing that the seized funds had been transferred to the federal government, Downey filed a motion requesting that the Division One Circuit Court set aside the transfer order issued by the Division Three Superior Court. Following significant briefing and several hearings, the Division One Circuit Court granted Downey’s motion and issued an order instructing the State to return the seized funds to Downey. This appeal follows.
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In light of the long-standing rule that one court cannot control the orders or process of any other court of equal jurisdiction, we conclude that the Division One Circuit Court abused its discretion in setting aside the order of the Division Three Superior Court. If Downey wishes to challenge the Division Three Superior Court’s order, he must do so before the Division Three Superior Court.
. . . As the State has already turned the funds in question over to the federal government pursuant to the transfer order, the State is no longer in possession of the seized funds. While it may seem bothersome that the State may divest itself of the funds by transferring them to someone other than the defendant and now argue that the issue is moot, we must recognize that the federal government is a separate governmental entity and is not a party to this action. As such, we conclude that Downey’s request for the funds is moot as the State cannot produce the funds that it does not possess.
RILEY, J., concurs.
ROBB, J., dissents with opinion:
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Moreover, even if I were to accept the majority’s premise that we must treat the courts as they existed when the case was filed, I would still disagree with the result. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case against Downey, and therefore, over the evidence relevant to that case. Yet, the State did not seek transfer of that evidence in the Circuit Court. Instead, it filed the motion in Superior Three, but took the motion to the Superior One judge for signature. If one court cannot control the processes of any other court of equal jurisdiction, then neither the Superior Three court nor the Superior One judge should have been issuing orders affecting a Circuit Court case. To the extent the distinction between the courts was important prior to reorganization or remains important now, the State itself did not hold the distinction in high regard and treated the courts even when they were separate as if they were interchangeable, filing the motion to transfer funds relating to a circuit court criminal case in one superior court and obtaining a signature on the order from the judge of an entirely different superior court. Accordingly, I also do not agree with the majority that Downey must challenge the transfer order only in Division Three if at all. See slip op. at 7. Even if that was the case, however, I question how he could do so when he was not even aware there was a transfer order out of Division Three until nearly two years after it was issued. Likewise, I do not agree with the majority that Downey’s request is moot. The money still exists even if it is no longer in the State’s immediate possession. That the State may need to recover it from the federal government or take other action to provide the relief the court ordered does not make this issue moot.