Crone, J.
In Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. 2014), the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a burglary conviction against the defendant based almost solely on a glove found at a crime scene containing the defendant’s DNA. Our supreme court observed that, “[l]ike a fingerprint, DNA is a marker of identity,” and that “‘[a] fingerprint found at the point of entry is accorded substantial weight because of its direct relationship to the element of illegal entry.’” Id. at 258 (quoting Mediate v. State, 498 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ind. 1986)). But whereas a fingerprint on a door or a window can conclusively establish that a person was physically present at a crime scene, DNA on a portable object is much less probative of a person’s physical presence at the scene. In fact, the court agreed with Meehan that “‘DNA can be transferred to an item very easily,’ thus making it possible that ‘the glove found at the scene could have been left by any person who found, borrowed or stole it from [him],’” and that he “‘could have very easily transferred his DNA to another person’s glove at some point prior to the burglary by a casual touching.’” Id. at 259.
Yet the court affirmed Meehan’s conviction, stating,
Our precedent requires us to look at all the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the verdict. Given the presence of Meehan’s DNA on the glove, Officer Gibbons’s uncontroverted testimony that the glove was discovered only steps from the point of entry of a secured building, Meehan’s lack of authorization to enter [the] building, and Meehan’s possession of potential burglary tools [i.e., bolt cutters, a pocket knife, a screwdriver, a chisel, and two Allen key sets], we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Meehan’s DNA was on the glove because he was wearing it at the time of the burglary. In the process, the jury necessarily rejected alternative explanations for the presence of both Meehan’s DNA and the glove.
Given that approximately seven billion other persons also lacked authorization to enter the building and that the “potential burglary tools” were found in Meehan’s possession while he was standing on a street corner over seven months after the burglary, we must conclude that under Meehan, the quantum of circumstantial evidence needed to affirm a criminal conviction in Indiana is extremely small indeed.
Before Meehan, we would have agreed with our dissenting colleague and reversed Willis’s conviction for insufficient evidence. But “we are bound to follow the precedent of our supreme court.” Smith v. State, 777 N.E.2d 32, 38 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003). Unlike Meehan, Willis was observed running near the scene of the alleged crime shortly after a security alarm was activated and voices and noises were heard inside the Center. Another man was seen running in the opposite direction. Evidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. Clark v. State, 6 N.E.3d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). [Footnote omitted.] Police also found a vandalized vending machine inside the Center and a vehicle with its doors and trunk open outside the Center. Officers apprehended Willis based on the description of Officer Clouse, who confirmed his identity. Based on the foregoing evidence and our supreme court’s application of the sufficiency standard of review in Meehan, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Willis was inside the Center and knowingly or intentionally interfered with the possession or use of its property without the owner’s consent. Willis’s argument to the contrary is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. Therefore, we affirm his criminal trespass conviction.
BAKER, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., dissents with opinion:
. . . .
A bit of review is in order. An alarm sounds, police are dispatched. While nearing the building from which the alarm emanated, an officer sees a black man running in a direction away from the building, approximately 100 yards in the distance. This man was Willis, and he was convicted of trespass. There is no evidence tying Willis to the scene. No fingerprints were recovered on the vending machine or on any doors. No footprints were found inside or outside the building. No connection was made between Willis and the car police discovered outside the building with its doors and trunk open.
The entirety of the evidence upon which Willis was convicted was the fact that he was seen running at a distance of approximately 100 yards. I am not convinced that this evidence can be construed as Willis’s fleeing from the scene of the crime. Even though we are bound to give the State a reasonable inference here, it is well-settled Indiana law that flight from a crime scene, in and of itself, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. . . . We are not in the business of horseshoes and hand grenades, where “close” is good enough. I am convinced the State has failed in its burden of proof and vote to reverse.