Dickson, C.J.
The defendant’s appeal is predicated upon a claim of insufficient evidence, but the defendant does not specify the element of the offense for which the proof is allegedly lacking. In relevant part, the Resisting Law Enforcement statute provides: “A person who knowingly or intentionally . . . (3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means . . . identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop; commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2012). [Footnote omitted.] . . . We note that the evidence clearly establishes that the defendant disregarded and walked away from a law enforcement officer who had adequately identified himself. Because the defendant’s argument focuses on whether the defendant had a duty to stop, we view his claim as alleging insufficient evidence to prove the element “after the officer has . . . ordered the person to stop.”
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We agree with the State that the language of the Resisting Law Enforcement statute, on its face, does not expressly require that the order to stop be lawful. Literally applied, however, the “after the officer has . . . ordered the person to stop” element of the statute, if applied in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, constitutes an unreasonable detention and impairs a citizen’s “right to ignore the police and go about his business,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d at 577, contrary to the Fourth Amendment.
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For these reasons, in order to interpret the statute as constitutional, we hold that the statutory element “after the officer has . . . ordered the person to stop” must be understood to require that such order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is, specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Absent proof that an officer’s order to stop meets such requirements, the evidence will be insufficient to establish the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing.
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Officer Newlin testified that he had responded to “just a disturbance” and that he had not seen the defendant or anyone else commit a crime prior to ordering the defendant to stop. Tr. at 15. Our legislature has not defined a “disturbance” as a crime, and thus a report of a disturbance, without more, is not a sufficient basis upon which to conduct an investigatory stop. See State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1033–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the investigatory stop lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot but adding that “[t]his case might have been different if [the defendant] had fled, engaged in furtive activity, and was uncooperative, or if [the officer] had a description of the suspect that was corroborated upon seeing [the defendant].”), trans. denied. Further, refusal to cooperate with police must be distinguished from unprovoked flight. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d at 577; see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. at 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d at 400 (“We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”). “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d at 576. Here, however, the defendant did not change his behavior when Officer Newlin appeared and ordered him to stop; he looked back two or three times but continued walking. See, e.g., Atkins, 834 N.E.2d at 1033 (finding no reasonable suspicion where the defendant did not change his behavior but continued walking in the police officer’s direction). And the mere existence of a disturbance, standing alone, does not identify specific, articulable facts that lead an officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot, as is required for a valid investigatory stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884–85, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911. Thus, the circumstances of the disturbance and Officer Newlin’s presence do not provide sufficient evidence to prove the element that the order to stop was supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. [Footnote omitted.]
Rucker, David, Massa, Rush, JJ., concur.