Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Leslie F. Pitcavage (Leslie), appeals the trial court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (Decree), issued pursuant to the dissolution of her marriage to Appellee-Respondent, Joel M. Pitcavage (Joel).
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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Second, Leslie claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that she obtain psychotherapy. Absent evidence that she suffers from a psychological disorder or otherwise poses a risk to the Child’s safety, Leslie contends that the trial court lacks “the authority to direct the mental health treatment of a party.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 26). Leslie does not reference any authority in support of her assertion, which would generally result in our finding that this issue has been waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). However, it appears from our search of the relevant case law that Indiana’s appellate courts have not yet addressed the authority of a trial court to impose psychotherapy in a marital dissolution and custody order. Therefore, we will address Leslie’s claim, waiver notwithstanding.
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We instead consider Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1(a), which provides that a non-custodial parent is entitled to exercise reasonable parenting time with his or her child “unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development” (emphasis added). Our court has previously held that trial courts have discretion to set reasonable restrictions and conditions upon a parent’s parenting time in furtherance of the child’s welfare. See Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 401-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, although the Decree does not expressly condition Leslie’s parenting time upon her participation in psychotherapy, the trial court did specifically adopt Dr. Ferraro’s recommendations regarding counseling. In his custody evaluation, Dr. Ferraro recommended that Leslie participate in psychotherapy and, subject to this intervention, she should receive the parenting time set forth in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Hence, based upon the trial court’s explicit adoption of Dr. Ferraro’s recommendations, we find that the trial court’s decision to award standard parenting time pursuant to the Guidelines is based upon its expectation that Leslie will comply with the mandate to undergo psychotherapy.
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We recognize that parents have an interest in rearing their children without undue interference from the courts, but in any child-related matter—whether it be custody, visitation, or termination of parental rights—the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration. Court-ordered psychotherapy may not be appropriate in every case, but here, where the evidence supports the mandate, we find the Child’s emotional development outweighs Leslie’s opposition to psychotherapy. Because the parenting time condition is based upon the trial court’s endeavor to protect the Child’s emotional well-being, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order Leslie to attend psychotherapy.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur