Rucker, J.
Martez Brown appeals his 150-year sentence imposed for two counts of murder and one count of robbery. Exercising our constitutional authority we revise Brown’s sentence.
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Typically, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over sixteen-year-old teenagers like Brown. However, in the case of some crimes—including murder and robbery—“[t]he juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an individual . . . [who] was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.” I.C. § 31-30-1-4(a). It is by virtue of this statute that Brown was tried as an adult. . . . .
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The record in this case reveals two circumstances we find important with respect to the nature of Brown’s offense.
First, and particularly important, although receiving the same maximum sentence as his two cohorts, Brown was apparently found guilty of both murders as an accomplice. As the prosecutor noted in closing argument, “the evidence suggests and probably indicates [Brown] did not kill anybody himself.” . . . .
Our second observation is that although senseless and reprehensible, the murders in this case were not particularly heinous. . . . .
The presentence report reflects that the instant offenses are the first for which Brown was charged as an adult. See App. at 64. And although Brown has a lengthy history of juvenile adjudications, the only violent offense appears to be a 2009 battery incident. See id. at 63. Although not reflecting favorably upon Brown’s character, Brown’s offenses do not appear particularly grave and more importantly are not related to his murder convictions. . . . .
The record also reflects that Brown has been using alcohol and marijuana since the age of ten, and he admitted to daily marijuana use. App. at 66.5. In one sense such abuse may be interpreted as evidence of Brown’s bad character. Indeed, longstanding drug or alcohol abuse without improvement despite opportunities for rehabilitation may support such a conclusion. See Mefford v. State, 983 N.E.2d 232, 237-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (finding forty-one-year-old defendant’s “extensive and prolonged history of alcohol and drug use despite prior treatment does not reflect positively on his character”). On the other hand where children and adolescents are the victims of addiction, this fact does not necessarily indicate bad character. . . . .
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Finally—and most significantly—Brown was only sixteen years old at the time of the crime. We take this opportunity to reiterate what the United States Supreme Court has expressed: Sentencing considerations for youthful offenders—particularly for juveniles—are not coextensive with those for adults. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (requiring the sentencing judge to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison” (footnote omitted)). Thus, both at initial sentencing and on appellate review it is necessary to consider an offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics.
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As noted earlier the trial court acted well within its broad discretion in imposing Brown’s sentence. However in the exercise of our constitutional authority to review and revise sentences, we have attempted to explain why we are of the view that the 150 year sentence here is inappropriate. But what is an appropriate sentence in this case? As we have acknowledged before, there is “no right answer . . . in any given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Instead appellate review and revision ultimately boils down to the appellate court’s “collective sense of what is appropriate, not a product of a deductive reasoning process.” Id. at 1225. Enforcing this collective sense we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Applying these considerations to the case before us, we conclude that Brown should receive an enhanced sentence of sixty years for each count of murder to be served concurrently and an enhanced sentence of twenty years for robbery to be served consecutively, for a total aggregate sentence of eighty years imprisonment.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.