BAKER, J.
Upon leaving the scene of the shooting, Torres drove Tuggle to Wishard Hospital where medical personnel—as is their typical routine in preparing to treat traumatic-injury victims for medical procedures—removed Tuggle’s clothing and placed his clothing in a bag. Moreover, as part of their standard operating procedure, the hospital reported to IMPD that a gunshot victim had arrived at the hospital. In response, IMPD dispatched an officer to the hospital. Detective Greg Hagan arrived at Wishard at approximately 11:45 p.m. on the evening of the shooting, introduced himself to Tuggle, and began interviewing him. Tr. p. 382. Tuggle was described as alert and conscious and told Detective Hagan that he had been playing a dice game at the Meadows apartments, and that one of the other players shot and robbed him of $360. Tuggle specifically stated that he was shot at 4126 Meadows, in the basement of the apartment. Because Detective Hagan believed that Tuggle was a gunshot victim and had no reason to believe that he was involved in the other shooting, he took Tuggle’s clothing to the crime lab in accordance with police procedure.
. . . .
. . . [T]he State correctly contends here that there was no violation of Tuggle’s Fourth Amendment rights and points out that Tuggle incorrectly asserts that the incriminating nature of the contents of the bag were “not readily apparent.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21-24. However, Tuggle ignores his own statements that he had been shot during an armed robbery. Moreover, Detective Hagan had no reason to doubt Tuggle’s assertion that he was the victim of a shooting, even though Tuggle lied to him about the other consequences of the shooting. And because Detective Hagan knew that the bag contained the clothing that Tuggle was wearing at the time of his shooting, the bag invariably contained evidence of a crime. As in Davis, Detective Hagan would have had “little trouble . . . in concluding that [Tuggle’s clothes] would almost certainly contain both blood and a bullet hole, and would thus be incriminating evidence in the prosecution of the shooter.” Id. at 235-36.
We also note that Tuggle has made no claim—and we have found no authority—suggesting that it is the alleged victim’s “call” in deciding whether law enforcement officials may or may not be justified in seizing certain evidence that may likely be pertinent to the commission and investigation of a criminal offense. Even though Tuggle might retain a possessory interest in his clothing, that circumstance does not obviate a police officer’s right to seize evidence of a crime. If it did, it might be likely that no evidence could ever be seized without a warrant.
The State also notes that Tuggle communicated to law enforcement personnel that he was a victim of a crime and did not express any objection to police officers removing his clothing from his presence. That said, because Detective Hagan knew that the bag contained the clothing Tuggle was wearing at the time of his shooting, the bag most likely contained evidence of a crime.
Finally, as noted above, law enforcement personnel showed restraint and neither searched nor tested Tuggle’s clothing until a warrant was obtained to do so. Tr. p. 48-49, 458-59. As a result, we agree with the trial court that such incriminating evidence could be used against Tuggle at trial. Thus, there was no violation of Tuggle’s Fourth Amendment rights, the bag of clothing was properly seized, and the DNA test results were properly admitted into evidence at trial.
BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.