Dickson, C.J.
On appeal, the State claims that the trial court lacked authority to modify the defendant’s sentence because more than 365 days had passed since the defendant was sentenced and the prosecutor did not affirmatively approve the modification. The State concedes that the prosecutor never expressly objected to a modification of the defendant’s sentence but contends that the trial court acknowledged that it did not have such authority and “clearly knew that the prosecutor did not approve and that any modification would be ‘over [the prosecutor’s] screaming objection.'” Appellant’s Br. at 5 (quoting Tr. at 5) (substitution by Appellant). The defendant counters that the prosecutor did approve the modification through acquiescence: “the overall tenor of the trial court’s comments at the January 25, 2013 hearing was that it intended to modify [the defendant’s] sentence absent an objection from the State and the State acquiesced in [the defendant’s] motion by failing to file any objection to the motion within a reasonable time.” Appellee’s Corrected Br. at 3. Further, the defendant argues, the trial court’s reference to the State’s “screaming objection” was “more of a facetious comment that the trial court, not the State, would bear the burden of any adverse consequences stemming from the modification of [the defendant’s] sentence as the State never expressly consented thereto.” Id. at 5. The State replies that mere acquiescence does not satisfy the statutory requirement of prosecutorial approval and challenges the binding authority of prior case law. [Footnote omitted.]
We find that, in the context of the interactions and communications between the trial court and the prosecutor in this case, the prosecutor’s conduct satisfied the “approval” requirement of the statute. The deputy prosecutor participated in the January 25 modification hearing. There, the trial court specifically told the deputy prosecutor that the court lacked authority to modify the defendant’s sentence, that it wanted to know whether the prosecutor’s office would approve, and that it would not modify the sentence over the prosecutor’s objection. In seeking the prosecutor’s consent, the trial court also stated: “If you tell me that your office is going to appeal [the court’s modification order] then I will save everybody the time and the energy and save the tax payers the money and I won’t do it.” Tr. at 3. The deputy prosecutor agreed with the trial court that he wanted “to think about that and talk about it with somebody else.” Id. At the end of the hearing, the trial court expressed it was “inclined to give it a try” and directed that the prosecutor’s office provide “more input” to the court “in the near future” or “in the next week or so.” Id. at 5. The deputy prosecutor agreed. Id. On March 5, over five weeks later with no response from the prosecutor’s office, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for modification.
Rucker, David, Massa, Rush, JJ., concur.