David, J.
The Indiana Code provides a mechanism for individuals to seek immediate emergency treatment for individuals they believe to be a threat to themselves or others. Here, a woman’s co-worker completed an application to initiate just such a process, which led a trial court judge to issue a warrant for the woman’s detention and treatment. The judge later grew skeptical as to the truth of the allegations set forth in the application and ordered the co-worker to appear in court, found her in contempt, and imposed sanctions. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to find the co-worker in contempt, and because the co-worker’s actions did not place her under the trial court’s authority to impose sanctions as an inherent power of the judiciary, we reverse.
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Here, the trial court found Townsend to be in indirect civil contempt. There are several potential statutory bases for such a finding. See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 34-47-3-1 (willful disobedience of court order or process), -3 (assaulting, influencing, or intimidating witnesses), -4 (false or inaccurate reporting of case, trial, or proceeding). But the trial court expressly found Townsend in indirect contempt pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-47-3-2. This provision provides that “[a] person who willfully resists, hinders, or delays the execution of any lawful process, or order of any court of record is guilty of an indirect contempt of court.”
It is apparent that Townsend’s conduct did not rise to meet that statute—nor could it. The factual basis for the trial court’s finding of contempt was that Townsend made false statements in the application for emergency detention, and that those false statements were used as the basis for the warrant issued to detain A.S. But the plain import of the statutory language is that the contemptuous misconduct is in the resisting, hindering, or delaying in execution of an existing process or previously issued court order. And here, as Townsend argues, there was no such lawful process or court order in place when she acted—rather, her actions initiated the lawful process or court order. It is axiomatic that she could not resist, hinder, or delay the execution of something that did not yet exist. Thus, the trial court acted outside of its statutory authority in finding Townsend in indirect contempt and its judgment to that effect is reversed.
The question then remains as to whether the sanctions that flowed from the trial court’s contempt finding may still be imposed independent of that finding. We have said that “the authority of a court to sanction a party for contempt is not a matter of legislative grace,” and that instead “the statutory definition of indirect contempt is merely a legislative recognition of our courts’ inherent power to cite and punish for contempt.” Major, 822 N.E.2d at 169. But at the same time there must still be some basis for the trial court to act in finding the party in contempt—there must have been a proceeding disrupted, for example, or a lawful order disobeyed. Cf. id. (“The law in Indiana is well settled that a person cannot be held in contempt of court for failure to obey an order if the issuing court had no jurisdiction to give the order.”) And without such an occurrence here, did the trial court’s inherent power to impose sanctions on Townsend still exist?
In this case, we think not. Though the inherent power of a trial court to impose sanctions is not always tied to a finding of contempt, the power serves the same purpose for a trial court: “to enforce obedience to its lawful orders against parties who have been subjected properly to its jurisdiction in the first instance.” Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind. 2001) (quoting State ex rel. Brubaker v. Pritchard, 236 Ind. 222, 226–27, 138 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1956)). And though courts have upheld the imposition of sanctions in a number of contexts not explicitly involving contempt, a commonality is that these circumstances arose within an ongoing judicial process and the sanctioned persons were engaged in that process. See, e.g., Rogers, 745 N.E.2d at 197–98 (concluding that Indiana Tort Claims Act did not provide State immunity from such sanctions, because “while the Legislature may shield the State from substantive tort liabilities, it may not immunize the State from our power to sanction the attorneys and parties appearing before us” (emphasis added)); Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“The trial court has the power to impose sanctions against a party or attorney who engages in egregious misconduct that causes a mistrial” and “for violation of an order that the party or attorney believes to be . . . erroneous.” (emphasis added)), trans. denied; see also Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Curatolo, 990 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Trial courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions on parties and attorneys for ‘discovery violations, contempt, and the government’s wrongful conduct.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Good, 919 N.E.2d at 153)). But that is simply not the case here.
Instead, Townsend’s role in this matter began and ended with her completion of the application for emergency detention. And that action did not even take place in the courthouse. Rather, Townsend went to the hospital, completed the application with a social worker, and had no further part to play once she signed the paperwork. It was the hospital that then faxed the physician-endorsed application to the court. And it was the trial court that approved the application and issued the warrant to detain A.S.
In that way, we do not see Townsend’s role here as being much different than a 911 caller who reports a person on the street acting dangerously. If that person is later charged and tried, the 911 caller is not automatically made subject to the inherent sanctioning power of that trial court just for having reported potential criminal conduct. The caller would have to be subpoenaed as a witness, or otherwise interfere with that trial process once it was initiated, in order to be subject to the court’s authority.
And if the caller was never subpoenaed but the 911 call was later revealed to be false, it would be the State who pursued a charge of false reporting. And perhaps the arrested and charged individual might seek civil redress from the caller in tort. But in such a circumstance it is not the trial court’s role within our system of justice to independently investigate the validity of reports that initiate legal proceedings, compel witnesses to appear before it, and mete out punishment when it finds those reports to be unsubstantiated.
A trial court cannot simply otherwise hale a citizen into court and sanction him or her. The inherent power of the judiciary to impose sanctions, while flexible and significant, begins and ends with the courtroom and the judicial process. Thus, because we conclude that the trial court here lacked authority for its contempt finding, and because Townsend otherwise committed no misconduct once the legal proceedings were initiated, she is outside the trial court’s inherent power to impose sanctions.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s judgment finding Townsend in contempt and imposing sanctions upon her.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.