David, J.
When a defendant is convicted for multiple crimes arising out of a single course of criminal conduct, Indiana’s sentencing statutes provide trial courts with some discretion in ordering the individual sentences for those crimes to run consecutively or concurrently. Here, a defendant’s aggregate sentence was imposed in such a way that one of the individual sentences was effectively a hybrid—it was ordered partially concurrent to the other sentences, and partially consecutive.
Is this form of sentence permissible? Because trial courts are limited to sentences authorized by statute, and because the relevant provisions of the Indiana Code here do not authorize such a hybrid sentence, the answer must be “no.” We therefore remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
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In 1995, a jury found Bryant Wilson guilty of rape as a class A felony, criminal deviate conduct as a class A felony, and armed robbery as a class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to forty-five years for each of the class A felony convictions and twenty years for the class B felony conviction. The forty-five-year sentences were ordered to be served concurrent to one another, but the twenty-year sentence was split: fifteen years were to be served concurrent with the forty-five-year sentences, and five years were to be served consecutive to them. The result was an aggregate sentence of fifty years.
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The statute in question provides that “the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively,” except in certain enumerated exceptions. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c) (Supp. 2013).2 We agree with the State’s reading of this provision, in that “the plain language of the statute contemplates only consecutive or concurrent terms, not a hybrid of both, for a sentence on one count.” (State’s Supp. Br. at 6.) And as the Amicus Professors point out, the concepts of “partially consecutive,” “hybrid,” or “blended” sentences do not arise in any sentencing provision of the Indiana Code. In other words, the Indiana Code grants the trial court discretion to determine, subject to certain qualifications, whether sentences are served consecutively or concurrently; but nothing in our statutory sentencing scheme grants a trial court authority to split a sentence into a partially concurrent sentence, with the remainder to be served consecutive.
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. . . We therefore expressly hold that absent specific authorization by the General Assembly not found in the current statutory scheme, trial courts may not impose partially consecutive, hybrid, or blended sentences for multiple convictions. They may impose consecutive sentences or concurrent sentences within the bounds of the statutory provisions—and may impose some sentences as consecutive and some as concurrent in a single sentencing order—but may not split a conviction’s sentence such that a portion of it is served consecutive to other sentences and a portion served concurrent.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.