Massa, J.
Here, Deputy Smith testified there were three reasons he stopped Keck: first, Keck was traveling approximately forty-three miles per hour on U.S. 36, which has a posted speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour; second, Keck came to a complete stop before turning left onto 100 East; and third, Keck drove down the middle of 100 East rather than on the right half of the roadway. Deputy Smith also testified, however, he did not believe either of these first two actions were unlawful, and on the probable cause affidavit, Deputy Smith listed the reason for the stop as “driving left of center.” App. at 10.
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Both Keck and the State agree that Ind. Code § 9-21-8-2 (2010) is the controlling statute, but the consensus ends there; the State argues Keck violated subsection (a), while Keck maintains his actions were permissible under subsection (b). The statute provides:
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway except as follows:
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing overtaking and passing.
(2) When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic under construction or repair.
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three (3) marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable to a roadway divided into three (3) marked lanes.
(4) Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic.
(b) Upon all roadways, a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing shall be driven:
(1) in the right-hand lane then available for traffic; or
(2) as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway;
except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.
Ind. Code § 9-21-8-2.
The trial judge in this case heard testimony from Deputy Smith, Keck’s passenger Grimes, and Keck himself. Deputy Smith testified County Road 100 East had at least two “chuckholes” in it. Grimes testified Keck was driving “a little slower” than normal. Finally, Keck testified there were “a lot of potholes” and loose gravel on the sides of the road. Thus, to the extent the trial court concluded Keck’s conduct fell within the purview of subsection (b) of Ind. Code § 9-21-8-2 and was therefore permissible, we cannot say that conclusion was clearly erroneous. What is more, even if Keck’s conduct fell within the purview of subsection (a), . . . the trial court concluded the State failed to show compliance with the statute was possible under these circumstances. Indeed, the trial court clearly concluded compliance was not possible: “Evasive action, including possibly driving left-of-center has become a necessity with the current conditions of our County Roads.” App. at 17. Again, we cannot say that conclusion was clearly erroneous. Based on the facts as the trial court found them—that Keck’s conduct was either authorized under subsection (b) or excused by road conditions—we must conclude Deputy Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Keck. We emphasize that our opinion today should not be taken to mean that driving left of center would never give rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a traffic stop. All we hold today is that here, in this case, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding, under these circumstances, that Keck’s driving left-of-center did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop him.
Finally, the State argues it was improper for the trial judge to take judicial notice of the deplorable road conditions in Putnam County, but we need not address that issue today. “We may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any theory supported by the evidence,” Ratliff v. State, 770 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. 2002), and the evidence in this case shows Deputy Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Keck. Thus, the trial court was correct to grant Keck’s motion to suppress the evidence against him.
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Rush, JJ., concur.