Massa, J.
As the two companion appeals we resolve today vividly illustrate, sometimes standards of review decide cases. [Footnote omitted.] In the instant case, the trial court found law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and admitted the resulting evidence; in State v. Keck, No. 67S01-1403-CR-179 (Ind. Mar. 25, 2014), the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. We affirm both trial courts and decline appellants’ invitation to invade the fact-finder’s province.
. . . .
Robinson argues Deputy Claeys lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle and thus violated her rights under both the federal and state constitutions. [Footnote omitted.] As a threshold matter, both parties dispute the significance of the video evidence. Robinson notes the trial court conceded the video “did not clearly demonstrate that Robinson’s vehicle veered off the roadway . . . but speculated that the officer’s observations at the scene were superior to his in-car camera.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. The State, on the other hand, cautions us not to “rest [our] determination on minutia of an imperfect and rudimentary video.” Appellee’s Br. at 8.
While technology marches on, the appellate standard of review remains constant. As we said above, we do not reweigh the evidence. Our colleagues in other states have taken a similar approach when faced with video evidence. . . . .
We do not believe, however, as some of our colleagues in other jurisdictions do, that the very act of reviewing video evidence constitutes impermissible appellate reweighing. . . . Rather, we consider video evidence admitted in the trial court to be a necessary part of the record on appeal, just like any other type of evidence. . . . .
And just like any other type of evidence, video is subject to conflicting interpretations. . . . .
What is more, “the video record may ‘speak for itself,’ but it does not and cannot speak for the visual input a judge observes and interprets that falls outside the scope of the camera, nor does it filter events and behavior through his or her experience and expertise.” Bernadette Mary Donovan, Note, Deference in A Digital Age: The Video Record and Appellate Review, 96 Va. L. Rev. 643, 676 (2010). Although this statement was made in the context of a discussion of appellate consideration of video trial transcripts, we believe the same reasoning applies to appellate consideration of video evidence, and even to law enforcement reaction to an evolving situation. Deputy Claeys, as he drove down County Road 4 on that October night, was observing Robinson’s vehicle through the lens of his experience and expertise. And when Deputy Claeys testified at the suppression hearing, the trial judge heard his testimony—along with the other witness testimony and evidence, including the video—through the lens of his experience and expertise. Ultimately, that experience and expertise led the trial judge to weigh Deputy Claeys’s testimony more heavily than the video evidence, and we decline Robinson’s invitation to substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court and rebalance the scales in her favor.
Dickson, C.J., and David and Rush, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion:
The trial court’s order thus makes plain the basis on which it found reasonable suspicion, namely: Robinson’s acts of making contact with the fog line. I agree with the Court of Appeals that more is required. Sustaining the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion on the basis that the court could have credited the officer’s testimony that Robinson drove “[c]ompletely off the roadway,” Tr. at 48, amounts to reweighing the evidence, which we are not permitted to do. [Footnote omitted.]
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous cases from other jurisdictions as well as prior Indiana precedent, all of which support the proposition that mere “brief contact with the fog line or swerving within a lane”—without more—is ordinarily insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. Robinson v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App 2013), vacated. I agree and would reiterate the observation that “if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or keeping one’s eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786–87 (10th Cir. 1995)). Therefore I respectfully dissent.