Per Curiam.
The Court has granted transfer to address due process safeguards where a magistrate presiding over a termination of parental rights hearing resigns before reporting recommended findings and conclusions to the judge. In this case and another termination case we decide today, In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.B., ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. 2014), we find the procedure used violated the parent’s due process rights.
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It is precisely because the judge or magistrate presiding at a termination hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing witness credibility and weighing evidence that we give great deference to a trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s rights. See In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.M., No. 45S03-1308-JT-557, 2014 WL 895207, at *3 (Ind. Mar. 7, 2014). But in this case, the magistrate who reported recommended findings and conclusions to the judge did not hear the evidence or observe the witnesses firsthand. And Father did not agree to have Magistrate Bradley recommend findings and conclusions based on a review of the record. See Farner v. Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251, 257-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding parties may stipulate to have successor judge who did not preside at evidentiary hearing decide the issues based on the record). We find the procedure used by the trial court violated Father’s due process rights. See In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1233 (finding due process violation where Magistrate Cartmel presided over parental termination hearing and then resigned, and Magistrate Bradley reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions to the judge, who approved the findings and conclusions and entered order terminating parent’s rights).
The Court of Appeals also found Trial Rule 63(A) authorized Magistrate Bradley to report recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. We find Trial Rule 63(A) inapplicable to this case. Trial Rule 63(A) permits a successor judge to perform the duties of the predecessor judge “after the verdict is returned or the findings or decision of the court is filed; but if he is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in his discretion grant a new trial or new hearing, in whole or in part.” Magistrate Cartmel resigned before reporting recommended findings to the judge. See Meade v. State, 588 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding Trial Rule 63(A) inapplicable where judge who presided over post-conviction hearing became unavailable before entering findings or decision).
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All Justices concur.