Massa, J.
This case raises a question of contract interpretation: in an insurance policy, does the phrase “limits of liability of this coverage” refer to the policy limit or to the insured’s total damages? We believe it is the former, but because this particular set-off would reduce the policy limit below the statutory minimum, we reverse the trial court.
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We find the policy language at issue in this case analogous to the language of Section D2 in Beam. Here, the American Family policy expressly and unambiguously states that the “limits of liability of this coverage will be reduced by . . . [a] payment made or amount payable by or on behalf of any person or organization which may be legally liable [and] . . .[a] payment made or amount payable because of bodily injury under any workers’ compensation or disability benefits law.” Appellee’s App. at 26 (emphasis added). The phrase “limits of liability of this coverage” clearly refers to the $50,000 policy limit, not to Justice’s total damages. In application, this means the “limits of liability of this coverage,” $50,000, will be reduced by the $25,000 payment Justice received from a “legally liable” entity—Wagner’s insurer—and by the $71,958.50 Justice received in workers’ compensation and disability benefits. The equation works out as follows: $50,000.00 policy limit – $25,000.00 from Wagner’s insurer – $71,958.50 = -$46,958.50. Thus, the policy limit is reduced to zero.
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Here, Justice’s policy limit was $50,000, which is the minimum amount the statute allows. But the worker’s compensation set-off provision, as the above equations demonstrate, operates to reduce that policy limit to zero. And so we must today decide whether Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2(a) permits such a reduction.
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Justice, unlike the employee in Hardiman, did not receive the full statutory minimum from the tortfeasor’s insurer; the minimum was $50,000, but Justice received only $25,000. If Wagner had carried the required amount of liability insurance, Justice would have received $50,000, and the purpose of our uninsured/underinsured motorist statute is to put him in that position. Thus, in light of that statutory purpose and the holdings of Leist and Hardiman, we conclude Justice is entitled to recover the remaining $25,000 from American Family. Any policy provision to the contrary is unlawful and unenforceable.
Conclusion
We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to American Family and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rucker, David, and Rush, JJ., concur.
Dickson, C.J., concurs with Parts B and C but, contrary to Part A, believes that the workers’ compensation setoff provision cannot apply to reduce benefits payable under the underinsured motorist policy because the policy expressly excludes coverage of injuries eligible for workers’ compensation.