Barnes, J.
After M.R. testified, the State also called as a witness the lead investigator in the case for the Greenwood Police Department, Patti Cummings. During direct examination, the State asked Cummings to relate what M.R. had told her about the attack during an interview conducted the day after it occurred. Corbally’s attorney objected to this line of questioning, asserting that it was asking Cummings to relate hearsay. Without waiting for a response by the State, the trial court stated: “Are you going to stipulate to the credibility of the alleged victim in this case? Because if you are going to challenge her credibility then certainly the state has a right to establish that her versions of the events in question are consistent.” Tr. p. 424. Corbally’s attorney stated that she could not stipulate to M.R.’s credibility and withdrew her objection. Cummings then proceeded to relate the entirety of M.R.’s statements to her, which were consistent with M.R.’s testimony.
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I. Admission of Hearsay
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The State contends that Corbally waived any objection to Cummings’s testimony because, although counsel initially lodged an objection, she withdrew that objection after being asked by the trial court whether she would “stipulate” to M.R.’s credibility as a witness. Tr. at 424. We decline to find waiver under these circumstances. When counsel lodged a hearsay objection to Cummings’s testimony, the trial court sua sponte gave clear indication that it would overrule that objection unless counsel stipulated to M.R.’s credibility. At that point, counsel reasonably may have believed it would have been pointless to maintain her objection because she was unwilling to stipulate to M.R.’s credibility. A central purpose of requiring contemporaneous objections to evidence is to permit a trial court the opportunity to prevent or remedy prejudice to a party without the waste of time and resources associated with the reversal of a conviction or judgment. N.W.W. v. State, 878 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The contemporaneous objection rule also prohibits parties from sitting idly by and appearing to consent to an offer of evidence, only to “cry foul” when the outcome goes against him. Id. at 509. Here, Corbally’s counsel indicated she did not “consent” to Cummings’s hearsay testimony. Also, the trial court was alerted to a hearsay concern with the testimony, and it effectively ruled that it would allow the testimony unless counsel stipulated to M.R.’s credibility. To the extent Corbally’s counsel then withdrew her objection, it was hardly a “consent” to Cummings’s testimony, as opposed to merely refusing to accept the trial court’s precondition for excluding the testimony.
Most importantly, the trial court’s belief that the State was permitted to introduce prior consistent statements of M.R. into evidence, simply because counsel was unwilling to stipulate to M.R.’s credibility as a witness, was a misinterpretation of the law. In 1975, the Indiana Supreme Court established a rule “that prior out-of-court statements, not under oath, were admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant was present and available for cross examination at the time of the admission of such statements.” Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind. 1991) (citing Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975)). In Modesitt, the court abrogated this rule because of various additional requirements and limitations that had been added to it. In its place, the court followed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) and held:
[F]rom this point forward, a prior statement is admissible as substantive evidence only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (a) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (b) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (c) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.
Id. at 653-54. The court stated that adoption of this rule was necessary to prevent “abuses” in the use of a witness’s prior consistent statements, such as by bolstering “the testimony of what might otherwise be regarded as a weak witness” and prohibiting “[n]umerous witnesses [from testifying] to the same statement given by a particular witness, thereby creating the prohibited drumbeat of repetition.” Id. at 653. Effective January 1, 1994, the court adopted Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1) governing substantive admission of prior out-of-court statements by a witness, which was identical to the language in Modesitt and was still in effect at the time of Corbally’s trial.
In applying the Modesitt rule and Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1) governing substantive use of prior consistent statements by a witness, and in particular whether there has been an “express or implied charge . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,” cases have made clear that there is a difference between merely challenging a witness’s credibility versus making an express or implied charge of fabricated testimony or improper influence or motive. See Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 511-12 (Ind. 1997). If there has only been general impeachment of a witness’s credibility, then prior consistent statements by the witness are hearsay and not admissible as substantive evidence. Id. Also, general attacks upon a witness’s memory do not constitute a charge that the witness fabricated testimony and do not permit the admission of prior consistent statements by the witness. Thomas v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1231, 1233-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also Lovitt v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that challenging witness’s recall of events due to consumption of alcohol was not a charge of fabricated testimony or improper influence or motive and did not permit introduction of prior consistent statements by the witness). In light of these holdings, it is clear the trial court erred in telling Corbally’s attorney that any challenge to M.R.’s credibility allowed the State to introduce prior consistent statements by her.
We also conclude Corbally’s attorney did not make any express or implied charge that M.R. fabricated her testimony or that she was acting under improper influence or motive. . . .
This general attack upon M.R.’s credibility and ability to accurately identify her assailant did not permit the State to “bolster” M.R.’s testimony by introduction of her prior consistent statements through Cummings’s testimony.
The State posits that Cummings’s testimony relating M.R.’s statements was admissible as non-hearsay “course-of-investigation” evidence, introduced to counteract Corbally’s contention that the police acted too hastily in apprehending him. . . . .
This court, our supreme court, and federal courts frequently have been skeptical of attempts by the State to introduce police officer testimony relating out-of-court statements under the guise of “course-of-investigation” evidence. See Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1253-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “While the need for this evidence ‘is slight, the likelihood of misuse [is] great.’” Id. at 153 (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 (4th ed. 1992)). “‘Statements offered to show background or the course of the investigation can easily violate a core constitutional right, are easily misused, and are usually no more than minimally relevant.’” Id. at 1255 (quoting Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Here, at the very most, some of Cummings’s testimony relating M.R’s description of her assailant might have been related to the course-of-investigation work that led to Corbally’s apprehension. Such evidence also might be related to M.R.’s identification of Corbally shortly after the incident and admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). But Cummings’s testimony relating M.R.’s statements went far beyond that. Instead, Cummings almost completely rehashed the grisly details of the crimes as already testified to by M.R. Such evidence was entirely irrelevant to the course of the investigation, and it was not admissible as “course-of-investigation” evidence. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. This court, our supreme court, and federal courts frequently have been skeptical of attempts by the State to introduce police officer testimony relating out-of-court statements under the guise of “course-of-investigation” evidence. See Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1253-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “While the need for this evidence ‘is slight, the likelihood of misuse [is] great.’” Id. at 153 (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 (4th ed. 1992)). “‘Statements offered to show background or the course of the investigation can easily violate a core constitutional right, are easily misused, and are usually no more than minimally relevant.’” Id. at 1255 (quoting Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Here, at the very most, some of Cummings’s testimony relating M.R’s description of her assailant might have been related to the course-of-investigation work that led to Corbally’s apprehension. Such evidence also might be related to M.R.’s identification of Corbally shortly after the incident and admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). But Cummings’s testimony relating M.R.’s statements went far beyond that. Instead, Cummings almost completely rehashed the grisly details of the crimes as already testified to by M.R. Such evidence was entirely irrelevant to the course of the investigation, and it was not admissible as “course-of-investigation” evidence. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.
BROWN, J., concurs.
ROBB, J., concurs as to Issue I and dissents without opinion as to Issue II.