Massa, J.
“Inevitably, in civil cases where related criminal charges are involved, tension will arise between plaintiffs’ rights to a just and timely adjudication and defendants’ rights to refuse to answer under the Fifth Amendment upon a reasonable fear of prosecution.” Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal citation omitted). The case we address today involves just this sort of tension; the civil trial court granted a limited stay of discovery against the defendant, but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. Both sides appealed, and we now affirm the trial court in all respects.
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On March 6, 2012, correctional officer Britney Meux was jogging with three co-workers when she was hit by a car. The driver fled the scene, and Meux later died from her injuries. Three days later, the State charged the alleged driver, Jason R. Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide as a Class C felony and three counts of criminal recklessness resulting in serious injury, all as Class D felonies.
A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death, alleging he was “negligent, reckless, and guilty of gross negligence and/or willful and wanton misconduct.” Appellant’s App. at 12. The Estate began the discovery process on April 27 by serving Cozmanoff with interrogatories and requests for production and by noticing his deposition.
This put Cozmanoff in a difficult position; if he were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s discovery requests, the civil jury could infer he is liable for causing Meux’s death. Gash v. Kohm, 476 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“Although the refusal to testify in a civil case cannot be used against the one asserting the privilege in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness’[s] refusal to testify.” (internal citations omitted)). On the other hand, if Cozmanoff were to provide discovery responses and permit his deposition to be taken, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial.
Cozmanoff, seeking a middle ground between the rock and the hard place, moved to stay the entire civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Estate opposed his motion, arguing (1) Cozmanoff’s criminal case might not be finally resolved for years, (2) discovery was necessary to identify other potential tortfeasors who must be joined before the running of the two-year statute of limitation, and (3) the stay would offend Article 1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees “Justice shall be administered freely . . . and without delay.” After the hearing, the trial court granted a limited stay of discovery as to Cozmanoff only, but it also entered an order requiring him to answer the complaint within 30 days.
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But the trial court’s decision in this case—to stay discovery against Cozmanoff but still require him to file an answer—is not unprecedented. See Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 269 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D. Conn. 2002) (finding, where defendant argued he would “be put at risk not only by being subject to discovery . . . but also by having to answer the complaint,” that a stay of discovery was adequate to protect his interest and a stay of the entire civil matter was unnecessary). “While sometimes it is appropriate to stay an entire civil proceeding, rather than just as to the party moving for the stay, there are also situations where the right against self-incrimination can be adequately protected while the civil case proceeds in some limited way.” Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 788. The trial court concluded this case fell into the latter category, and we are not convinced that conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
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Conclusion
After making its decision, the trial court acknowledged the stay was not a perfect solution: “I’m not at all satisfied with this ruling. But I think it’s the best I can do right now.” Appellee’s App. at 34. In light of all the circumstances we have discussed above, we cannot disagree. Our ruling today does not mean the trial court was constitutionally required to impose the stay; simply that it did not abuse its discretion by so doing. [Footnote omitted.] Indeed, were we to hold otherwise, it would be hard to imagine a set of circumstances in which it would be an appropriate exercise of a trial court’s discretion to order a stay for a defendant in Cozmanoff’s position.
We therefore affirm the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion today.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, David, and Rush, JJ., concur.