Friedlander, J.
Joseph and M. Carmen Wysocki appeal the denial of their request for attorney fees and additional damages under Indiana’s Crime Victims Relief Act, i.e., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-24-3-1 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st Reg. Technical Sess.) (the CVRA).
We affirm.
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This brings us to the current appeal. Upon remand, the trial court determined that the defects in question were clearly within the actual knowledge of the Johnsons at the time the disclosure form was completed, and therefore the court entered judgment in favor of the Wysockis with respect to the cost of performing the necessary repairs. On the other hand, the trial court denied the Wysockis’ request for attorney fees and expert fees under the CVRA. This is the ruling that the Wysockis appeal. In a nutshell, the Wysockis urge this court to create “a categorical ‘bright line’ rule that the Crime Victims Relief Act is applicable in instances where a seller is held liable [for] false or incomplete statements in their disclosure forms [.]” Appellant’s Brief at 24. We will discuss only the request for attorney fees, but our conclusion applies with equal force to other fees recoverable under the CVRA.
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The Wysockis contend that the CVRA applies here because the Johnsons’ actions constituted the offense of criminal deception, an offense defined in I.C. § 35-43-5 as one involving “Forgery, Fraud, and Other Deceptions”. In order to obtain a conviction under this provision, the State would have been required to prove that the Johnsons (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) made false or misleading written statements (3) with the intent to obtain property. See I.C. § 35-43-5-3(a)(2) (West, Westlaw current through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st Reg. Technical Sess.). Of course, as with all crimes, the State would have had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson v. State, 780 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
The foregoing reflects that the elements of common-law fraud and the criminal offense of fraud are different. So, too, is the burden of proof necessary to prove those two allegations. Thus, it cannot be said that authorization of attorney fees in the CVRA for victims of criminal offenses that can be categorized as fraud extends to the common-law tort of fraud. Simply put, in its current form, the CVRA authorizes certain fees only for victims of certain, specific criminal offenses, as well as for liability arising under I.C. § 24-4.6-5 et seq., which does not apply here. The Wysockis were not victims of the criminal offense of fraud because the Johnsons were not charged with that crime in relation to the sale of the house, much less convicted of it in a court of law. In the absence of such a conviction, the CVRA does not apply. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the Wysockis’ request for attorney fees under its provisions.
Judgment affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.