David, J.
One issue is contested here: whether a trial court has discretion to refuse to order commitment to the DMHA where it concludes that a defendant found not competent to stand trial can never be returned to competency. . . . .
When a defendant files a motion for a competency determination, the trial court must follow the procedures of Ind. Code chapter 35-36-3. Under Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(a) (Supp. 2013), if the trial court “has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense,” then the trial court shall appoint two or three “competent, disinterested” psychiatrists, psychologists, or physicians “who have expertise in determining competency.” At least one of the appointed individuals must be a psychiatrist or psychologist. [Footnote omitted.] Id. “The individuals who are appointed shall examine the defendant . . . as to whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense.” Id.
Following the competency evaluation, Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(b) provides, in pertinent part:
[i]f the court finds that the defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense, the trial shall proceed. If the court finds that the defendant lacks this ability, it shall delay or continue the trial and order the defendant committed to the division of mental health and addiction. The division of mental health and addiction shall provide competency restoration services.
(emphasis added).
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The language of Ind. Code §§ 35-36-3-1,-3, and -4 is unambiguous. Giving each word its plain meaning, it is clear that the legislature intended the trial court and the superintendent to have clear responsibilities and separate duties in determining a defendant’s competency to stand trial: the trial court initially determines whether the defendant is competent to stand trial, and if he or she is not currently competent, then the superintendent of the state institution—after providing services aimed at restoring competency—determines whether the defendant has a substantial probability of attaining competency within the foreseeable future. Plainly, the statute does not give trial courts discretion to refuse to commit a defendant once it determines that he or she is not competent to stand trial.
Accordingly, by finding Coats not competent to stand trial but denying the State’s motion to commit him to the DMHA for competency restoration services, the trial court here did not follow Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(b). Although the trial court had no discretion to refuse to commit Coats, our analysis does not end here, for Coats does not dispute the plain meaning of the statute. Rather, he argues that regardless of the statutory scheme, the State may not detain a defendant found not competent to stand trial for competency restoration services once the trial court has determined that the defendant cannot be restored to competency.
. . . .
Ultimately, we affirmed Davis’s motion to dismiss the charges against her, because (1) Davis’s pretrial confinement in psychiatric institutions exceeded the maximum sentence the trial court could have imposed; and (2) the State advanced no argument that its interests outweighed Davis’s liberty interest. Id. at 290. These specific circumstances led us to conclude that “it is a violation of basic notions of fundamental fairness as embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold criminal charges over the head of Davis, an incompetent defendant, when it is apparent she will never be able to stand trial.” Id.
Coats argues that since he suffers from a progressive disease and will never regain competency, fundamental fairness forbids the sexual battery charge being held over his head. For Coats, Davis is also significant for the proposition that commitment “necessarily entails a finding of probability that the accused can be so restored.” Id. at 289. But as set forth below, Coats fails to understand a central lesson of Davis: the importance of a proper finding that a defendant’s competency cannot be restored.
. . . .
Critical in Davis, Curtis, and here is a proper finding that a defendant’s competency to stand trial will never be restored. Through the plain language of Ind. Code § 35-36-3-3, the legislature entrusts only the superintendent of the state institution where the defendant has been committed with the power to determine that the defendant does not have a substantial probability of attaining competency to stand trial within the foreseeable future. The legislature’s choice is deliberate, as it is the DMHA’s experts who observe and work with the committed defendant for up to ninety days. Compared to court-appointed doctors that meet with the defendant for an hour, the DMHA experts have more time and vastly more information upon which to base their decision. [Footnote omitted.]
. . . .
From the plain language of Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(b), there are two possible results from a competency hearing: the first is that the trial court finds the defendant competent to stand trial, and the trial proceeds accordingly; the second is that the trial court finds the defendant not competent to stand trial and orders the defendant committed to the DHMA for competency restoration services. But Coats contends that there are three possible determinations a trial court can make: (1) the defendant is competent to stand trial; (2) the defendant is currently not competent to stand trial but may attain competency in the future; or (3) the defendant is currently not competent to stand trial and will never attain competency in the future. We cannot read his third option into the statute. As evidenced by Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(b)’s unambiguous language, the legislature did not intend for trial courts to determine a defendant’s future competency. By finding Coats not competent to stand trial but refusing to order commitment, the trial court did not follow the law as it is written.
In all likelihood, the trial court here was motivated by the probability that Coats, at the time nearly seventy years old and suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, is unlikely to ever be competent to stand trial. Although the trial court had the best of intentions, it was bound to follow Ind. Code chapter 35-36-3 and had no discretion to substitute its determination as to whether Coats would eventually attain competency for that of the superintendent of the state institution where he should have been committed. Only by following the strict statutory framework set forth by the legislature in Ind. Code chapter 35-36-3 can both the interests of the State and Coats be protected.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, Massa, and Rush, J.J., concur.