Rucker, J.
In this appeal we address whether evidence obtained after entry of an order granting a motion for partial summary judgment may form the basis for vacating that order on grounds that a non-final order is subject to revision at any time before entry of a final judgment. We conclude it may not. We also address whether relief from judgment under our Trial Rules is limited only to final judgments. We conclude it is not.
….
This case requires us to explore the interplay between Trial Rule 54(B) – Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties and Trial Rule 56 – Summary judgment, when new evidence is submitted to the trial court following entry of partial summary judgment….
….
Three years later, in HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 2008), the Court acknowledged that “prior case law ha[d] been somewhat inconsistent regarding the authority of a trial judge to consider affidavits filed after the thirty-day deadline in Rule 56(C).” Id. at 98 (citing cases). We noted however that “[a]ny residual uncertainty” about the inconsistent case law was resolved in Borsuk when, citing Desai with approval, the Court declared: “When a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period.” Id. at 98-99 (quoting Borsuk, 820 N.E.2d at 124 n.5). In essence, HomEq reaffirmed the bright-line rule first declared in Desai which precludes the late filing of responses in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Starks Mech. Inc. v. New Albany-Floyd Cnty. Consol. Sch. Corp., 854 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the “bright-line rule” and declaring, “even though [the non-movant] was merely one day late [in serving his response to a summary judgment motion], Desai stands for the proposition that the trial court had no discretion to allow [the non-movant] to file its response and designated evidence”).
Now firmly entrenched as an article of faith in Indiana law, this bright-line rule provides clarity and certainty to an area of the law that for too long lacked both. But how can the dictates of Rule 54(B) “subject to revision at any time” be reconciled with the apparently conflicting “thirty (30) day[]” time limit imposed by Rule 56(C)? Where trial rules are in conflict we apply the principles of statutory construction under which “the Rules of Trial Procedure are to be construed together and harmoniously if possible.” In re Marriage of Carter-McMahon, 815 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also Noble Cnty. v. Rodgers, 745 N.E.2d 194, 197 n.3 (Ind. 2001) (noting the rules of statutory construction are applicable to the interpretation of trial rules). In order to harmonize Trial Rule 54(B) and Trial Rule 56(C) we hold that although a trial court may indeed make material modifications to a non-final summary judgment order, it must do so based on the timely submitted materials already before the court when the order was initially entered. Stated somewhat differently the “subject to revision” language in Rule 54(B) permits a trial court to revise, modify, or vacate a non-final prior ruling; but where that non-final ruling was the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may only consider the Rule 56 materials properly before it at the time the order was first entered. To hold otherwise would allow a party to avoid the strict timelines for designating evidence under Rule 56 and would resurrect the uncertainty the Desai line of cases sought to eliminate.
Here the trial court revised its previous order granting partial summary judgment in Mitchell’s favor. Under other circumstances this would not be problematic. However, by understandably but mistakenly misinterpreting the law, the trial court abused its discretion in relying on evidence not properly before the court at the time the previous order was entered.
II.
Although LLC’s argument before the trial court as well as on appeal focused primarily on Trial Rule 54(B), LLC also contends it is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)…..
….
However, Rule 60(B) was amended in 2008 effective January 1, 2009, which is the current version of the Rule, and the Rule in effect at the time LLC filed its motion. The 2008 amendment deleted the word “final” such that the rule now provides in relevant part, “the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default . . . .” Thus, the express language of the rule no longer limits relief only from a “final” judgment as was the case when we decided Allstate. In light of the 2008 amendment, LLC is not precluded from seeking Trial Rule 60(B) relief from the trial court’s January 2010 order on grounds that the order was not a final judgment. [Footnote omitted.] On this point the trial court erred.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.