Vaidik, C.J.
Thompson argues that the trial court’s imposition of a seven-year consecutive sentence was erroneous because she was not convicted of a “crime of violence,” as defined in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, and therefore, her sentence exceeds the maximum sentence allowable under the consecutive-sentencing statute. Specifically, she argues that Class D felony causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 is not a “crime of violence” under Section 35-50-1-2(a).
. . . .
Section 35-5-1-2(a) states:
As used in this section, “crime of violence” means the following:
. . .
(15) Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury to another person (IC 9-30-5-4).
. . . .
I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a) (emphasis added).
Thompson argues that a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury is different than a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury. See, e.g., Warner v. State, 497 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“If we were to adopt a construction of these statutes that would permit the State to establish guilt of driving while intoxicated merely by proving that the driver had a BAC of .10 percent or above, any substantive distinction between driving while intoxicated and the per se offense would cease to exist and the per se offense would be rendered meaningless. . . . Such a result would be inconsistent with our conclusion that the two crimes are not the same offense, in that they have been defined to have different elements.”). She further argues that because her conviction is for a different offense than the one listed in Section 35-5-1-2(a), it is not included within the definition of a “crime of violence.”
However, the State argues that Thompson disregards the statutory citation next to the text of the offense under subdivision fifteen. After the text, “Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury to another person,” it is written “(IC 9-30-5-4).” The State argues that the statute cited in parenthesis after the text is controlling. Indiana Code section 9-30-5-4 states:
(a) A person who causes serious bodily injury to another person when operating a vehicle:
(1) with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per:
(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood; or
(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s breath; . . . .
. . . .
We agree with the State that Thompson’s convictions for Class D felony operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury are included within the definition of a “crime of violence.” Under the definition of a “crime of violence,” subpart fifteen includes the statutory citation without limiting it to causing serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle while intoxicated under Section 9-30-5-4(a)(3). We think the citation to the statute is evidence that the legislature intended to include both crimes within the definition of a “crime of violence.”
RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.