Sharpnack, Senior Judge
Meadows contends that he is entitled to receive credit for the time he served on electronic monitoring while he was in the drug court program. Pre-sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, and for that reason trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, sentencing decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Id.
Necessary to our discussion is an understanding of Meadows’ status while he was being electronically monitored. Meadows pleaded guilty to two counts of Class C felony forgery and admitted to violating his probation all pursuant to a plea agreement that allowed for a deferral of the proceedings. In Indiana, a trial court, without entering a judgment of conviction, may defer proceedings against an individual and place the individual in a problem solving court program if certain criteria are met, including that the individual pleads guilty and consents to the referral to the problem solving court program. See Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14 (2011). When an individual’s participation in a problem solving court program under this statute has been terminated, the individual’s case may be referred back to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction, or, if the individual fulfills the conditions established by the problem solving court, the charges may be dismissed. See id.
The terms of Meadows’ plea agreement provided that the trial court would defer entry of judgments of conviction upon Meadows’ plea and, with his consent, would place him in the county drug court program. Pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, if he successfully completed the drug court program, the charges to which he had pleaded guilty would be dismissed, and, accordingly, he would avoid the convictions and sentence that would have been imposed upon his plea of guilty. In addition, the petitions alleging violations of probation to which he had admitted would be dismissed, and the corresponding penal consequences would be avoided. In summary, Meadows was in a program to which he consented that had the potential to clear his record of these convictions and probation violations and permit him to avoid serving any sentences related thereto. With this in mind, we turn to our state’s statutory framework.
Meadows cites Indiana Code section 35-38-2.5-5 (2001), which allows the trial court to order home detention as a condition of probation. . . . .
Indiana Code section 35-38-2.5-5 is inapplicable to Meadows’ time on electronic monitoring because he was not being monitored as a condition of his probation. In fact, Meadows was not on probation for this cause during the time he was being electronically monitored; rather, he was being monitored as part of his voluntary participation in a drug court program, which, if successful, would wipe clean his slate of charges in this cause. Thus, this statute does not apply here.
In further support of his alleged entitlement to credit time, Meadows cites Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-6(a) (2010), which states that a person “who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time.” Meadows’ reliance on this statute is also misplaced. Indiana Code chapter 35-38-2.6 applies to the sentencing of a convicted person. . . . .
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Here, Meadows was placed into a deferral program under Indiana Code section 33-23-16-14. Indiana Code chapter 33-23-16 does not provide for the application of credit time. Therefore, with no mandate in place with regard to the grant or denial of credit time in this instance, the trial court is free to exercise its discretion. See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449. Here, Meadows voluntarily agreed to participate in the drug court program. Failure to successfully complete the program would result in conviction and sentence, but successful completion of the program would result in complete dismissal of all charges and pending probation violations. Drug court deferral programs provide an opportunity for those qualified to avoid conviction and sentence, but only if they comply with the conditions of the program. The policies related to facilitating the presence at trial of a person charged (i.e., confinement awaiting trial or sentencing) or to applying appropriate punitive measures after conviction (i.e., imprisoned for a crime) do not apply to drug court deferral. To allow credit time to a person who fails to comply with deferral conditions diminishes the value of such programs in that the incentive to comply is undermined by the reward for failure.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.