Barnes, J.
Next, we address Campbell’s argument that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction to the jury when it asked for a definition of “intent” during its deliberations:
A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct, but to cause the result.
Trial Tr. p. 998. The jury had not previously been instructed on the definition of “intent” or “intentionally.” Campbell does not present a cogent argument that the trial court could not give a supplemental instruction of the definition of “intentionally” during deliberations but does argue that the second sentence is a misstatement of the law and trial counsel should have objected to it being given.
The above instruction, including the second sentence, is from Indiana Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 9.05. The first sentence is a verbatim recitation of the statutory definition of “intentionally” found in Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2(a). Regarding the second sentence, this court stated in Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, that a jury instruction containing that sentence, when combined with other instructions given, “properly informed the jury of the State’s burden of proof.” However, in Corley v. State, 663 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), this court held that it was proper to refuse to give a defendant’s tendered jury instruction that included the second sentence because it was “not a correct statement of the law.”
Campbell relies upon Corley in arguing that trial counsel should have objected to the second sentence of the instruction being given to the jury. Furthermore, he seems to claim the second sentence relieved the State of its burden of proving his intent to kill the Kincaids under the attempted murder charges. Essentially, Campbell posits that the second sentence informed the jury that simply because he had been charged with attempted murder, it “must have been his conscious objective” to kill the Kincaids. Trial Tr. p. 998.
Although this is a novel argument, we see Campbell’s point that it would be preferable either for the second sentence not to be included in the pattern jury instruction, or that if it is to be included, it should be rewritten to state, “If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, the State must prove that it was his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct, but to cause the result.”
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.