Friedlander, J.
In Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-6 (West, Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation) allocates the lion’s share of punitive damage payments to the State. In this case, we must decide whether the statute empowers the State to intervene in otherwise private litigation, ostensibly to protect its interest in a punitive damage award. Concluding that I.C. § 34-51-3-6 confers no such authority, and acknowledging that the only proper parties to this litigation have reached a post-trial settlement agreement, we dismiss.
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In sum, Weinberger, the Estate, and the PCF have settled this matter, and if not for the State’s intervention, this appeal would be at an end. In his brief, Weinberger argues that the State’s intervention was improper and raises a number of additional issues, all ultimately directed at undermining the punitive damages award. In its brief, the State concedes that some of Weinberger’s arguments “appear[] to be well taken.” Appellee’s Brief at 8. The only issues briefed by the State are whether it was properly allowed to intervene and the interpretation of the damages caps set forth in I.C. §§ 34-18-14-3 and 34-51-3-4. In order to resolve this appeal, we need address only the question of whether the State was properly permitted to intervene.
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We need not resolve the specific issue of whether intervention at the appellate level is permitted because we conclude that under I.C. § 35-51-3-6, the State is not permitted to intervene at any stage of the proceedings. [Footnote omitted.] The State was not involved in the underlying incident. It had no rights or duties that were implicated in the physician/patient relationship between Barnes and Weinberger. The State has an interest in this matter only to the extent the legislature says it does. Thus, the statute creating and conferring status upon the State in punitive-damages cases is the sole repository of authority governing the State’s participation in the litigation. Accordingly, we decline to look elsewhere, such as Ind. Trial Rule 24, to inform and supplement the limited rights conferred upon the State pursuant to I.C. § 34-51-3-6.
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In sum, I.C. § 34-51-3-6 does not permit the State to become a party to otherwise private litigation at any stage of the proceedings, and we therefore reverse this court’s prior order granting the State’s motion to intervene. Because the only proper parties to this appeal have amicably resolved their dispute, there is nothing left for us to decide; accordingly, we dismiss. Upon petition by the parties, the trial court shall vacate the damages judgment against Weinberger.
Appeal dismissed.
BAKER, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.