Rucker, J.
Characterizing as a “crucial step” the transferring of blood from a piece of glass to a swab for testing, Speers contends his right of confrontation was violated because the technician who performed this function “never testified nor was subject to cross examination.” Br. of Appellant at 8. The facts are these. As indicated earlier a Martinsville police evidence technician observed what appeared to be small drops of blood on two pieces of broken glass present at the crime scene. The officer placed each piece of glass into a separate box, sealed the boxes with red evidence tape, and affixed his initials. He later took this evidence to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for testing. A laboratory technician—Nichole Stickle—transferred the purported blood drops from the glass and swabbed them onto a white cloth for testing. Stickle did not testify at trial; however, she “[did]n’t do any testing.” Tr. at 194. Instead Lori James—a forensic DNA analyst for the Indiana State Police Laboratory—conducted the analysis of the swabs taken from the piece of glass. Among other things she testified: “As a DNA analyst I receive items of evidence that contain potential sources of DNA. And I examine those items of evidence to develop a unique profile from them, so that I may be able to either include or exclude a person as being a possible contributor to that sample.” Tr. at 170. Over Speers’ objection the State introduced three exhibits into evidence, all of which James prepared after conducting her analysis: Exhibit 7—STR Summary Sheet identifying two “swab[s] of glass”; Exhibit 9—Certificate of Analysis noting the “DNA profile obtained from the swabs of the glass . . . is consistent with an unknown male . . . .”; and Exhibit 10—Certificate of Analysis noting the “DNA profiles obtained from the swabs of glass . . . match the DNA profile of Scott Speers . . . .” Vol. of Exhibits (State’s Ex. 7, 9, 10). After comparing a known sample of Speers’ DNA (obtained through a cheek swab pursuant to a search warrant) to the swabs taken from the glass found at the crime scene, James concluded: “In the absence of an identical twin, Scott Speers is the source of the DNA to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. . . . and the statistic for this particular sample is 1 in 3.4 quintillion.” Tr. at 214.
Speers insists his right of confrontation was violated because the State failed to present Stickle for cross examination. And he grounds his argument in two of the four separate opinions written by justices of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). Williams involved a comparison of two DNA profiles, one of semen recovered from a rape victim and one residing in the state’s forensic database. A male DNA profile was developed by Cellmark, an accredited outside laboratory, from swabs taken from the victim’s rape kit. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230. The database profile was developed by a state police laboratory analyst from a sample taken from the defendant pursuant to his arrest in 2000 on unrelated charges. At trial, the State presented the analyst who performed the testing of the defendant’s sample. She testified as to the process she used to develop the DNA profile, and she stated that she had entered the profile into the state’s forensic database. Id. at 2229. The State then presented an expert witness who testified as to the chain of custody of the vaginal swab sample. Specifically, this witness confirmed that records of the state police lab reflected that the lab had sent the vaginal swabs to Cellmark and that Cellmark had returned them along with a deduced male DNA profile. Id. at 2230. The witness then testified that she found a match between the Cellmark DNA profile derived from the vaginal swabs and the defendant’s DNA profile. Id. But Cellmark’s report on the vaginal swab profile was not admitted into evidence, no Cellmark analyst testified at trial, and the state’s expert did not testify that she had conducted or observed the testing on the vaginal swabs. Id. Five justices on the Williams Court determined that the state’s expert’s testimony was not an adequate substitute for testimony from the Cellmark analyst who performed the testing on the vaginal swabs. [Footnote omitted.] See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2268 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Unlike Williams, here both DNA profiles were analyzed by a single analyst—state police lab analyst Lori James. James completed and signed the Certificate of Analysis matching the DNA obtained from the glass swabs to the DNA obtained from Scott Speers. And James testified at trial as to her process in testing and analyzing all these samples, and as to her conclusion in making the match. Tr. at 203-06, 212-14. James testified that she did not actually prepare the glass swabs but that another technician had transferred the blood from the pieces of glass to the swabs that James eventually tested. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Williams—in which the testimony of the analyst who performed the DNA testing on the crime scene sample was entirely absent—provides little guidance in evaluating the facts before us. See Speers, 988 N.E.2d at 1244 (finding Williams “inapposite”).
However, in rejecting Speers’ Confrontation Clause argument the Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s opinion in Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009). Although we do not agree with Speers’ assertion that Williams abrogated Pendergrass, we do conclude the continued validity of Pendergrass has been undermined by subsequent authority from the United States Supreme Court. But as we explore below the subsequent authority confirms that Speers’ right of confrontation was not violated.
. . . .
Shortly after our Pendergrass decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). That case involved a driving while intoxicated conviction which was based in part on a forensic laboratory report certifying the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration. Similar to the facts in Pendergrass, the analyst who performed the testing and signed the certification did not testify at trial. Instead, the state called another analyst who, like the supervisor in Pendergrass, was familiar with the laboratory testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test on the defendant’s blood sample. In deciding the case the Court declared:
The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.
Id. at 2710 (emphasis added). Thus Bullcoming makes clear that it does not “suffice[ ] for Sixth Amendment purposes” that the State may merely call as a witness a laboratory supervisor “with direct involvement” in the technical process. Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 708. Instead “surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification.” Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
Hence although Pendergrass provides the State no refuge, Speers nonetheless cannot prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim. In this case the sole analyst who conducted the DNA testing and prepared the laboratory reports that were introduced as exhibits did in fact testify at trial. This is precisely the procedure dictated by Bullcoming. By contrast, the witness about whom Speers complains was merely the technician who removed the sample for later testing and analysis—just one person involved in the chain of custody of the evidence. The question is whether the State was required to present this witness as well in order to honor Speers’ constitutional right of confrontation. This point seems to have been put to rest in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). . . . Responding to the dissent’s concerns about the consequences of its holding, the Melendez-Diaz majority declared:
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion . . . we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case. While the dissent is correct that “[i]t is the obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody” . . . this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (quoting id. at 335). See also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712 n.2 (“It is up to the prosecution . . . to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence . . . .”) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1).
Essentially, there is no Confrontation Clause violation where the State introduces evidence and links in the chain of custody of that evidence are missing. Indeed, “the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.” Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 1991). In this case Speers pointed out during cross-examination of James that she was “not the person who took the purported blood off the glass,” “that witness is not going to be testifying here today,” and “if that person screwed it up, no matter what you did after the fact, all you would get would be an erroneous result.” See Tr. at 220, 21. The significance of any gap created by the absence of Stickle’s testimony was a matter for the jury to weigh. The trial court did not err by admitting the DNA evidence over Speers’ Confrontation Clause objection.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.