Rucker, J.
As indicated above, before DeFronzo resumed her testimony, at Halliburton’s request the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction. Halliburton now contends the instruction was “improper.” Br. of Appellant at 20. However, Halliburton did not object to the instruction. And “[n]othing is preserved on appeal where a defendant fails to object to a limiting instruction.” Stahl v. State, 616 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ind. 1993). Thus, as with most of Halliburton’s claims we view this issue also through the lens of fundamental error.
The instruction at issue declared:
You’re about to hear evidence that is being offered for a limited purpose. The evidence that you are about to hear is not being offered to prove the character of any person. It is offered for the limited purpose of establishing proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. It’s admissible for that limited purpose because I have ruled that is relevant, and the probative value outweighs any prejudice there may be. The evidence, as I said, is being admitted for this limited purpose and for no other purpose.
Tr. at 559 (emphasis added). [Footnote omitted.] Essentially focusing on the highlighted language of the instruction, Halliburton contends the trial court improperly vouched for the credibility of the evidence as well as commented on the weight the jury should give the evidence.
It is mandatory for a trial court, upon request, to give a limiting instruction or an admonishment where evidence is introduced for limited purposes. See Evid. R. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.”). However, we have long held that “an instruction directed to the testimony of one witness erroneously invades the province of the jury when the instruction intimates an opinion on the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given to his testimony.” Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Fox v. State, 497 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ind. 1986); see also Taylor v. State, 278 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. 1972) (“An instruction in a criminal case is erroneous, as an invasion of the province of the jury, if it intimates an opinion of the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given to his testimony.”).
Here the instruction did not imply that the trial court had formed an opinion on the credibility of a witness or the weight the jury was to give the witness’ testimony. However, the instruction nonetheless advised the jury that the trial court had made a preliminary determination that the testimony the jury was about to hear is “relevant” and that the trial court had made a preliminary determination that the probative value of such testimony “outweighs any prejudice there may be.” Tr. at 559. Although appropriate as an evidentiary ruling, the highlighted portion of the limiting instruction should not have been read to the jury in that it had no role in the matter. “The court and not the jury determines the admissibility of evidence, and the foundation for the admission of secondary evidence is a matter alone for the court and not for the jury.” Sprague v. State, 181 N.E. 507, 512 (Ind. 1932); Pritchard v. State, 230 N.E.2d 416, 417 (1967) (“This being a criminal case, the determination of the admissibility of the evidence is a function alone of the trial court . . . .” (citations omitted)). [Footnote omitted.]
In the end we conclude the limiting instruction was given in error. However, Halliburton makes no claim the error was fundamental. And we find no such error to have occurred.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.