Robb, C.J.
Case Summary and Issue
The marriage of Katherine Ryan and Larry Janovsky was dissolved in 1991 pursuant to a settlement agreement that included a provision dividing Janovsky’s pension. Over twenty years later, Ryan presented a proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) for Janovsky’s signature. Janovsky refused to sign, and Ryan filed a Verified Petition for Contempt and Rule to Show Cause, alleging Janovsky was in contempt of the parties’ settlement agreement for failing to sign the QDRO. Ryan appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding her efforts to secure a QDRO were barred by the statute of limitations and the equitable doctrines of laches and waiver. Concluding the entry of a QDRO is not time-barred, we reverse and remand.
….
The particular question of when a QDRO must be submitted is an issue of first impression in Indiana. The parties’ dissolution decree provided for an equal division of Janovsky’s monthly pension benefits calculated as of the date of the decree. However, because no QDRO securing Ryan’s right to this portion of Janovsky’s pension was prepared and submitted for over twenty years, Janovsky argued, and the trial court agreed, that Ryan had forfeited her right. We agree with Janovsky and the trial court that the delay was “inordinate,” App. of Appellant at 23, and we note that Ryan offered no explanation for the extremely lengthy delay in preparing the QDRO. Nonetheless, we cannot agree that the delay has caused the forfeiture of Ryan’s right to a portion of Janovsky’s pension benefits. Ryan’s right to part of Janovsky’s pension benefits arises from the settlement agreement; the QDRO only creates her right to be paid directly from the pension plan. And neither of these rights is yet enforceable because Janovsky’s pension benefits are not yet payable to anyone. Allowing Janovsky to retain the entirety of his pension benefits because of the delayed preparation of a QDRO is supported by neither law nor equity: the statute of limitations and caselaw relied upon by Janovsky do not support his position, and the trial court’s order leads to an inequitable result that cannot stand.
…
The result of the trial court’s order – which not only denies the entry of the QDRO but affirmatively states that Ryan is no longer entitled to a portion of Janovsky’s pension – is a windfall to Janovsky, who agreed as part of the dissolution of his marriage to Ryan to share a portion of his pension benefits when he began receiving them. And we note that even if the statute of limitations did bar the entry of a QDRO at this late date, all that would mean is that Ryan was not entitled to receive her share of the benefits directly from Janovsky’s pension plan. She would still be entitled to payment of those amounts directly from Janovsky pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.
Conclusion
Because Ryan’s request for the entry of a QDRO securing her right to payment from Janovsky’s pension plan is not time-barred by law or equity, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ryan’s motion and ordering that she was not entitled to the previously-agreed portion of Janovsky’s pension benefits. The trial court’s order is therefore reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.