Pyle, J.
“Credit for time served” is defined as “the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for time actually served.” Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999), review denied. “Good time credit” is “the additional credit a prisoner receives for good behavior and educational attainment.” Id. Because Roberts appeals the trial court’s decision on both types of credit, we will discuss each type in turn.
1. Credit Time for Time Served on Pre-Trial Home Detention
Roberts first challenges whether the trial court properly credited him for 611 days of actual time served. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred by halving his credit for actual time served with the expectation that the Department of Correction (“DOC”) would award him good time credit for each day, thus having the practical effect of giving him credit for 610 days, rather than 611. On cross-appeal, the State argues that Roberts is not entitled to any credit for actual time served for the days he spent on pre-trial home detention, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding him that credit.
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As the State correctly points out, Purcell is controlling precedent. In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that “a defendant is only entitled to credit toward sentence for pre-trial time served in a prison, jail, or other facility which imposes substantially similar restrictions upon personal liberty.” Purcell, 721 N.E.2d at 224, n.6. See also Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 451 (“Specifically, Molden argues here that because a convicted person serving his sentence on home detention is entitled to credit for time served toward a subsequent prison sentence if the court revokes the home detention under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5, a person in pre-trial home detention is likewise entitled to credit for time served against any eventual sentence. We cannot agree.”) (internal citation omitted).
Therefore, the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny Roberts any credit for time served in pre-trial home detention. See Lewis v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1286, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Lewis would not be awarded credit time for pre-trial home detention”); Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[I]t is our determination that the trial court did not err when it refused to credit Senn’s sentence for time served on home detention as a condition of pre-trial release”); Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 451 (“[W]e hold in this case that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Molden sentence credit for time spent in pre-trial home detention”).
However, in the present matter, as both parties point out, the trial court attempted to give Roberts day-for-day credit against his sentence (rather than two-for-one credit time), by approximately halving the number of days he actually spent on pre-trial home detention with the expectation that the DOC would award him an equal number of credit time days. See Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 789-92 (Ind. 2004) (creating the presumption that when a trial court reports only days spent in pre-trial confinement without designating credit time, the DOC should “automatically [] award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.”). While the trial court is within its discretion in assigning Roberts credit against his sentence for the 611 days he spent on home detention, Purcell, 721 N.E.2d at 224, n.6, the problems with its method of achieving that result are two-fold. First, by only assigning Roberts credit for 305 actual days served, with the expectation that the DOC would double that number, the trial court’s decision had the practical effect of giving Roberts credit for 610 days, rather than 611 days. Second, as the Indiana Supreme Court made clear in Robinson, if a trial court wishes to deny a defendant credit time, “[it] must report it in the sentencing judgment.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 789.
To properly deny Roberts two-for-one credit time and instead give him credit only for the actual number of days spent on pre-trial home detention, the trial court should have granted him 611 days actually served against his sentence and expressly denied him any credit time under Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 for those days. Alternately, should the trial court wish to deny Roberts credit for any or all of the 611 days, it would be within its discretion to do so, see Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 451, but again, it would need to report the denial in its sentencing judgment. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 789. We therefore reverse the trial court’s assignment of 305 days actual time served and remand for sentencing consistent with Robinson and this opinion.
2. Good Time Credit for Time Spent Released on Bond in Pre-Trial Detention
Roberts next challenges the trial court’s decision not to award him good time credit for the days he spent on pre-trial home detention. Specifically, Roberts recognizes that there is no basis for awarding him good time credit but argues that “[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to explain why time spent on home detention as a condition of probation merits credit for time served and good time credit while credit for time spent on home incarceration prior to conviction is not worthy of equal treatment.” (Roberts’ Br. 13.)
This Court has explained previously the distinction between home detention pre- and post-conviction. In Senn, we were not persuaded that “home detention as a condition of pretrial release is ‘upon the same terms’ as home detention as a condition of probation,” Senn, 766 N.E.2d at 1202, and nowhere does Roberts argue that he has established their equivalence. Furthermore, we have held previously that because “the potential consequences . . . are much more serious for a post-conviction violation than a pretrial violation,” Lewis, 898 N.E.2d at 1291, pre-trial home detention is “not worthy of equal treatment.” Id. at 1290. Roberts’ argument on this ground is therefore unavailing.
Furthermore, as the State correctly points out, Roberts’ reliance on this Court’s recent decision in Peterink v. State, 971 N.E.2d 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. granted, summarily aff’d, 982 N.E.2d 1009 (Ind. 2013) (holding that good time credit was statutorily mandated for home detention as a condition of probation) is misplaced, as Peterink concerned only home detention as a condition of probation, not pre-trial home detention. Although Roberts also points to that case, in addition to the legislature’s 2010 lifting of the good time deprivation in Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6 as “illustrat[ing] a change in legislative direction justifying the crediting of time served or good time to all home detention, whether pre-sentence or post-sentence” (Roberts’ Br. 12), we are not moved.
There is no basis in statute or case law for awarding good time credit to a defendant for time spent on pre-trial home detention. Indeed, Roberts recognizes that he is not entitled to good time credit, but he nonetheless persists in arguing that this Court should depart from precedent and award him such credit because he “can see no justification for Indiana’s current statutes and caselaw [sic] to deprive him for credit for time served and the good time credit for the 611 days he spent on home detention prior to trial.” (Roberts’ Br. 13). We will not do so. Our standard of review is limited to an abuse of discretion, Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 451, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding Roberts good time credit for the time he spent on pre-trial home detention. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision on this issue is affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BARNES, J., concur.