Rucker, J.
In this case we address whether Indiana’s Public-Private Agreements statute requires a local legislative body to first adopt the statute before it may issue a request for proposals or begin contract negotiations as provided for under the statute. We hold it does not.
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Setting aside the fact that Indiana is a home rule state, see, e.g., Kole v. Faultless, 963 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. 2012), thus calling into question the persuasiveness of the authority on which Kitchell relies, we note the home rule statute provides in relevant part: “[i]f there is a constitutional or statutory provision requiring a specific manner for exercising a power, a unit wanting to exercise the power must do so in that manner.” I.C. § 36-1-3-6. The question in this case is whether the “specific manner” required before a City may exercise the power to enter a public-private agreement includes a sequencing requirement. We think not. And Kitchell puts more weight on the words “applies” and “adopts” than the Act can bear. It is certainly the case the legislature has set forth particular procedures that must be followed in order that a political subdivision may enter into a contract under the Act. For example, the RFP must contain certain language, offerors must be treated fairly and equally, and a public hearing must be held and notice of such hearing must be published in a particular way and contain particular language. I.C. §§ 5-23-5-2, -5, -9. But nowhere does the Act require a political subdivision to “adopt” the Act before taking any further action consistent with the Act. A reading of the Act as a whole indicates that it is designed to promote economic development which is executed in way that is transparent and open to public input and scrutiny. The record before us reflects that the City complied with the Act in every particular. Viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Kitchell, and with every inference construed in her favor, we conclude that as a matter of law Kitchell is not entitled to relief. Thus the trial court properly granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.