David, J.
Here Austin’s initial traffic stop was forty-five minutes long, but that was consistent with Trooper White conducting his Level III DOT inspection. After that, he was told he was free to leave—and he was. He was not detained further at the initial stop; he was sent on his way. He was followed like Quirk, but Austin was not intercepted at a rest stop and blocked from returning to his truck while a canine officer was requested. Instead Trooper Dockery—accompanied by Hondo—waited farther up the Toll Road and did not pull Austin over until Austin committed not one, but two traffic violations. In the course of the stop for those violations, after independently confirming Trooper White’s suspicions, Trooper Dockery and Hondo conducted a sweep of the exterior of Austin’s truck that resulted in an alert for narcotics.
. . . .
We therefore conclude that neither Trooper White’s nor Trooper Dockery’s detentions of Austin—nor the collective police action—constituted an unreasonable search or seizure under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. In point of fact, whether by intention or by coincidence we think this particular police operation exemplifies the balance between pursuing the law enforcement aim and protecting the constitutional rights of the suspect that the Indiana Constitution compels. The officers here noticed things that their training told them were indicators of drug trafficking, but they did not indefinitely hold Austin while they confirmed those suspicions. Instead they let him go, while coordinating to put the assets they needed in a place where they would be useful, and waited until they had an independent—and constitutionally valid—reason to stop Austin again. And once he was stopped again they re-confirmed their earlier suspicions and promptly validated them by use of a trained narcotics dog. The end result was the discovery and seizure of nearly ninety pounds of cocaine hidden in a vehicle transiting our state, and also the proper admission of that evidence at Austin’s trial.
. . . .
Thus Criminal Rule 4(B) presents at least three hurdles at the trial court level: First, when a criminal defendant files a motion for a speedy trial, the trial court must set the defendant’s case for trial within seventy days—which might require, to an extent we discuss below—a re-prioritization of its current caseload. Second, if the trial court finds it cannot accomplish this prioritization and bring the defendant to trial within seventy days because of court congestion, it may order a continuance—and that finding of congestion is then subject to challenge by way of the defendant’s motion for discharge. And third, if the trial court orders such a continuance, it still must keep sight of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial—and Rule 4(B) therefore permits the continuance only to the extent that the defendant proceeds to trial within a reasonable time after the close of the seventy-day window.
. . . .
The constitutional protections embodied by Criminal Rule 4 necessitate a prioritized treatment when a defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule 4(B)—a treatment beyond simply assigning that defendant’s case to the next presently vacant trial setting on the calendar.
Rather, it must be assigned a meaningful trial date within the time prescribed by the rule, if necessary superseding trial dates previously designated for civil cases and even criminal cases in which Criminal Rule 4 deadlines are not imminent. We recognize, however, that emergencies in either criminal or civil matters may occasionally interfere with this scheme. Similarly, there may be major, complex trials that have long been scheduled or that pose significant extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses, which will, on rare occasions, justify application of the court congestion or exigent circumstances exceptions.
Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551–52. Thus, courts recognize that Rule 4(B) does not necessarily present a bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the defendant who files a speedy trial motion. McKay v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
For example, in the criminal arena speedy trial motions are subject to their own internal prioritization. Where a longer-incarcerated defendant moves for a speedy trial, his or her request should generally take priority over a more recently charged movant. But this would not necessarily be the case if, say, the more recently charged defendant’s Criminal Rule 4 deadline was significantly more imminent and there remained time after that deadline to hold the trial of the longer-incarcerated defendant before his or her deadline. See James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind. 1999). Where the trial court’s calendar can satisfy both Rule 4 deadlines, the longer-incarcerated defendant need not necessarily go first. After all, Rule 4 effectuates a “speedy” trial—not necessarily the “next” trial. But at the same time, and absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.
Similarly, “[a]lthough the right of the accused to a speedy trial stands higher than similar rights of civil litigants, civil settings need not always give way to criminal settings required by the time limitations in Crim. R.4.” Baker v. State, 590 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Gill v. State, 267 Ind. 160, 165, 368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1977)). In addition to prioritizing the long-scheduled, complex civil matters or those with extenuating circumstances we referenced in Clark, civil settings must give way to speedy trial motions only “where the continuance of the civil trial will result in sufficient time to fully prepare for and accommodate the criminal trial.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368 N.E.2d at 1162.
Nevertheless, “in order for the meaning of the rule not to be eviscerated, it is essential that courts honor requests made for speedy trials by scheduling trial dates within the time prescribed by the rule.” McKay, 714 N.E.2d at 1188. And we therefore have referred to this as a requirement that speedy trial motions receive “particularized priority treatment.” Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551. But we do not intend to suggest that a trial judge must necessarily wipe his or her calendar clean, or jam a trial into an opening in a schedule or courtroom that lacks the space, time, and resources to accommodate it. They must, however, be mindful of their calendar and the seventy-day window and exercise all reasonable diligence to preserve the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
But at the same time, the aim of providing a speedy trial should never risk an unfair or incomplete trial. Rather, the trial judge should set the defendant’s trial for the first setting not already occupied by a superseding speedy trial request or exceptional civil matter, or, if need be, create a new trial setting if time allows for the availability of a courtroom, witnesses, jury pool, and other necessary resources.
C. Austin’s Motions
There can be a number of reasons why a criminal defendant might request a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4, ranging from solely vindicating his or her constitutional rights to a tactical move designed to force the State’s hand and prompt a trial (or plea) before the evidence is fully developed. Both are equally legitimate, and justify the effort trial judges must take in reviewing—and rearranging—their calendars in light of a speedy trial motion. And we expect that criminal defendants in such cases would actively work with the trial court to ensure their trial moved along in an orderly and judicious fashion.
But what the rule does not contemplate, as we have said, is pursuit of a technical means to escape prosecution by, post-hoc, pot-shotting the trial court’s calendar. This is why we reject a bright-line approach to its application. A criminal defendant may not, for example, after moving for a speedy trial and at the conclusion of his or her seventy days, simply present the trial court’s past calendar and point to every gap, every day off, every non-trial use of the courtroom, and say “Gotcha! I must be discharged!” Not successfully, at least.
Here, Austin filed his motion for a speedy trial on June 6. Ten days later, his trial was set for August 8—roughly a week inside his seventy-day window. On July 27, the State moved to continue his trial due to congestion, arguing first that criminal defendant Eldon Harmon, who had a cause pre-dating Austin’s, had also moved for a speedy trial—and Harmon had been in custody for nearly two years at that point. It also argued that there were fourteen additional criminal cases pending, involving twelve separate defendants, all of which pre-dated Austin’s case—but it did not allege that any of those twelve defendants had filed motions for a speedy trial. Without a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion for a continuance a few days later, setting a pre-trial conference for August 11.
Austin then requested that this pre-trial conference be moved forward a week, to August 4, and objected to any continuance of his trial. Austin said that he had a number of witnesses and family members who had booked plane flights from California and reserved hotel rooms and rental cars in Indiana, and would—if anything, apparently—need a trial date earlier than August 8 in order to transfer those tickets and reservations.
At the August 4 pre-trial conference, the trial court noted Harmon’s speedy trial motion as the basis for a finding of congestion and rescheduled Austin’s trial for September 26. Austin objected for the record, and on August 17—after his seventy-day window closed—filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4.
Austin did not claim that the prior defendant’s trial should not have taken precedence over his, but instead argued that no trials were scheduled for the week of August 15—the Monday of which was the last day of his speedy trial window—and that his case could therefore have proceeded that day. In support of this he attached the trial court’s August schedule and an affidavit from his counsel’s secretary, attesting that she had been in the courtroom on the morning of August 15 and observed that no trials or judicial proceedings of any kind were taking place.
The trial court held a hearing on Austin’s motion on September 1. Austin again argued that his trial could have occurred on August 15. In response, the trial judge clarified that a custody and child support hearing that had been scheduled for that Monday morning had been moved to Monday afternoon and did, in fact, occur.
The State also pointed out that no jury had been called for the week of August 15, that the trial court was not prepared to hear a jury trial that week, and that the State could not have subpoenaed witnesses for that week on such short notice. The trial court maintained Austin’s September 26 trial date (and in doing so implicitly denied Austin’s motion for discharge).
So in accordance with the standard of review we discussed above, the trial court’s initial finding of congestion requiring Austin’s trial to be continued from August 8 is presumed valid. It then became Austin’s responsibility to come forward with proof that the finding was factually or legally inaccurate. This we think he did by way of his motion for discharge and attached exhibits highlighting the trial calendar and apparent scheduling vacancy on August 15. Absent the further findings from the trial court to explain the congestion, this would have been prima facie adequate for discharge. But once the trial court made further findings, the burden shifted back to Austin to show that those findings were clearly erroneous. See James, 716 N.E.2d at 939.
On appeal, Austin argues that the trial court justified congestion based on the August 15 custody hearing. But he says that hearing was not an emergency hearing nor was it a particularly complex matter. Therefore, he claims he could have—and should have—been tried on August 15 and it was clear error for the trial court to decide otherwise.
But a variety of things could constitute congestion. Loyd, 272 Ind. at 409, 398 N.E.2d at 1265. And although the trial court here did not issue a written order further explaining its finding of congestion, the transcript of the pre-trial conference indicates that several circumstances supported its determination.
The starting point was of course the court’s initial decision to try the prior criminal case on August 8 instead of Austin’s case. And though not necessarily always required, we find nothing wrong with the decision to prioritize the speedy trial request of a defendant who had been in custody for nearly two years over the request of one who had been in custody for a few months. But not setting a trial date for the following week was also based on the unavailability of the courtroom on August 15, as well as the unavailability of a jury that week and the unlikely availability of witnesses on short notice.
In light of the deference we show to a trial court’s decision in these cases, we think this combination of concerns is sufficient to support a finding of congestion. While a trial court cannot blindly adhere to a calendar management process that, for example, by default only schedules criminal trials (and juries) on a biweekly basis, and then use that process as an excuse to refuse to acknowledge a speedy trial motion even when the trial court has enough time to call a jury, that is not what happened here. Here, the State filed its motion for a continuance on July 27 and the trial court initially approved it on July 29 (a Friday). Even if the trial court had immediately drawn names for prospective jurors and mailed those jurors a notice and summons, it is unlikely that such notice would have reached its recipients in time to comply with our jury rules—to say nothing of the other logistical requirements involved in holding a multi-day criminal trial on short notice.
The availability of witnesses presented a similar concern. The State argued that its witnesses could not have been subpoenaed in time for an August 15 trial, and Austin himself expressed a like view with respect to his own witnesses. This case involved a number of out-of-state individuals traveling to testify, and it was reasonable to find that sliding their travel plans back a week—with only a week’s notice—was an unnecessarily burdensome requirement on those individuals where the trial could instead be reasonably reset to a later date. Simply put, as the State said, “[s]ome of the logistics surrounding this trial lend it to a more complex environment, [and] it doesn’t lend to a quick continuance and a quick resetting.” (Tr. at 237.)
And this makes it largely irrelevant whether the courtroom was already in use for another matter and whether that matter was deemed an “emergency.” Continuance of the contested custody and child support hearing would still “not necessarily have accommodated the trial of [Austin’s] case” because it still “would not guarantee a courtroom and a jury.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368 N.E.2d at 1162. Finding otherwise would have accomplished nothing but providing the inefficient administration of justice in both the civil and the criminal cases.
In sum, we do not find the trial court’s decision to continue Austin’s trial beyond his seventy-day speedy trial window to be clearly erroneous.
However, we caution that “court congestion” is not a blank check for poor judicial administration. A defendant with adequate proof may successfully challenge a declaration of “court congestion” on appeal. The protections afforded a defendant under Criminal Rule 4 are not to be trampled upon and trial courts must remain vigilant in its enforcement.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, Massa, and Rush, J.J., concur.