Baker, J.
This case is one of several termination cases stemming from Magistrate Cartmel’s resignation to reach this court. Magistrate Cartmel resigned after the hearing without reporting factual findings or conclusions to the juvenile court. As a result, the case was transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley. Magistrate Bradley reviewed the record and reported factual findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores, who approved Magistrate Bradley’s findings and conclusions and issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
In this case, T.P. (Father) challenges the order terminating his parental rights with regard to his minor son, I.P. Father was incarcerated on both days that the termination hearing took place, but he participated telephonically and was represented by counsel. Although Father does not challenge the substance of the order terminating his parental rights, he maintains that the judgment violated his right to due process and the provisions of Indiana Trial Rule 63(A) because Magistrate Cartmel, the magistrate who actually heard the evidence, did not issue the recommended order.
We conclude that Magistrate Bradley’s subsequent recommended order terminating Father’s parental rights did not violate the trial rules or Father’s right to due process. Thus, we decline to set aside the order terminating Father’s parental rights and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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As noted above, Magistrate Bradley reviewed the record. Absent his careful review of the evidence, he would have been unable to issue the specific and detailed findings that are contained in his proposed order. Even more compelling, Father has failed to identify any specific prejudice that resulted from Magistrate Bradley’s review of the record and his subsequent recommendation of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Indeed, one who seeks to disturb a judgment has the burden of showing an erroneous ruling and resultant prejudice. TeWalt v. TeWalt, 421 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). The fact that a determination was made by a judge or magistrate is not conclusive on the issue of neutrality. Green v. State, 676 N.E.2d 755, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, a judge is presumed by law to be unbiased and unprejudiced. To overcome this presumption, the party seeking to disqualify a judge must establish actual personal bias. Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Father was represented by counsel throughout the two-day hearing. Appellant’s App. p. 5-11. Father’s counsel was provided with the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, as well as the opportunity to introduce evidence in defense of the action. Under these circumstances, we have recognized that the risk of an inaccurate result decreases significantly. C.T., 896 N.E.2d at 587. It is apparent that counsel protected Father’s interests during the trial, thus decreasing the chance of an error in the evidence that Magistrate Bradley had reviewed.
In sum, Father has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced as a result of Magistrate Bradley’s issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended order after reviewing the evidence. Thus, Father’s claim that his right to due process was violated fails. [Footnote omitted]
In this case, it is apparent that Magistrate Cartmel was unavailable to suggest a final order or judgment regarding the petition to terminate Father’s rights because she resigned from her magistrate position after the final hearing but before a ruling was made. Under Trial Rule 63(A), any other judge regularly sitting in the judicial circuit asked to rule in the present case could, in his or her discretion, grant a new trial or hearing if he was satisfied that the substitute duties for Magistrate Cartmel could not be performed. Similarly, Magistrate Bradley is in the same superior court as was Magistrate Cartmel. Thus, he could prepare findings from a record that was created before the initial judge, or he could have granted a new hearing if he deemed it necessary to do so. See Ruby v. State, 166 Ind. App. 310, 315, 335 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1975) (finding no error when the judge who heard the evidence in a post-conviction relief case found against the petitioner but later died, and the judge’s successor, with the assistance of the record of the hearing, made the required findings consistent with the previous decision). Like the circumstances in Ruby, we find no error in Magistrate Bradley’s issuance of the recommended order on the pending termination petition. Rather, the decision to issue the order that was consistent with the evidence presented at the termination hearing was a logical one, and permitting the decision to linger would have delayed I.P.’s permanent placement. For all these reasons, we decline to set aside the order terminating Father’s parental rights as to I.P.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
In this case, the majority concludes that Father’s due-process rights were not violated when Magistrate Bradley reviewed the record and reported findings and conclusions to Judge Moores, despite the fact that Magistrate Bradley did not preside over the underlying evidentiary hearing. I respectfully concur in result because I agree, but my reasoning differs from the majority’s. [Footnote omitted] I believe that Magistrate Bradley did not err because the underlying evidence was undisputed and did not require him to make any credibility determinations.
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