Brown, J.
On April 15, 2013, Ott filed a “Verified Motion to Convert Class D Felony Conviction to a Class A Misdemeanor Pursuant to I.C. 35-50-2-7(c).” Id. at 39. On April 29, 2013, the court denied Ott’s motion. The court’s order states:
Court denies such Motion for the following reasons:
1. Court lacks jurisdiction to modify [Ott’s] sentence more than one (1) year after date of the original sentencing; and
2. [Ott’s] conviction was not for a class D felony. The designation of “Class D Felony” did not exist in Indiana before July 1, 1977. Moreover, [Ott] received a determinant [sic] sentence of five (5) years, which under the prior sentencing standards, which sentence is substantially in excess of the maximum sentence available for a class D felony.
The Court not only lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by [Ott], [Ott] would not be entitled to the relief requested even if the Court had jurisdiction.
Id. at 41. On May 6, 2013, Ott filed a motion to correct error. On May 9, 2013, the court conceded that it had jurisdiction under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 to convert a class D felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor conviction but affirmed that Ott had not been convicted of a class D felony and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.
. . . .
Based upon the language in the relevant statutes, we cannot say that the legislature provided for a modification of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction for a felony committed prior to the division of felony classes. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court had authority to grant Ott’s motion to convert his conviction to a class A misdemeanor. See generally State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ind. 2011) (observing that “[a]lthough it may be equitable and desirable for the legislature to give a trial court discretion in modifying a conviction years later for good behavior, we recognize at this time the legislature has not given any such authority,” and holding that the trial court erred in granting Brunner’s motion for modification of conviction because the legislature had not enacted any such authority for the trial court), reh’g denied; Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Brunner for the proposition that “modification of conviction for good behavior may be equitable and desirable, but only after legislature grants authority to courts”) (emphasis added).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Ott’s motion to correct error.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.