Robb, C.J.
Case Summary and Issues
Appellant Christina Atkins appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for leave to file a belated appeal under Indiana Trial Rule 72(E). [Footnote omitted.] Atkins raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Atkins’s Rule 72(E) motion and (2) if so, whether the trial court erred by granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC (“Veolia”). Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Atkins’s motion under Rule 72(E), we affirm. [Footnote omitted.]
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It is undisputed that Atkins’s counsel received a copy of the Order. Receipt of a copy of an order from the trial court “constitutes notice for all purposes.” Blichert v. Brososky, 436 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Because lack of notice is a prerequisite to relief under Rule 72(E) and Atkins had notice of the Order, her arguments as to the second portion of the rule are premature and ultimately irrelevant.
The plain language of Rule 72(E) necessitates the result in this case. And, although no court has previously held that lack of notice is a prerequisite for relief under Rule 72(E), statements by the Indiana Supreme Court lend support to our interpretation of the rule. In Markle v. Indiana State Teachers Ass’n, our supreme court stated that “this court amended T.R. 72(D) to its present form to provide essentially that counsel could rely on the clerk’s office to send notice and if such notice was not received, to provide an avenue through which to challenge the mailing of the notice.” 514 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ind. 1987) (emphasis added). [Footnote omitted] Moreover, in Collins v. Covenant Mutual Insurance Co., our supreme court noted that “Trial Rule 72(E) plainly states that only if the CCS does not contain evidence that a copy of the court’s entry was sent to each party may a party claiming not to have received such notice petition the trial court for an extension of time to initiate an appeal.” 644 N.E.2d 116, 117-18 (Ind. 1994) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, to our knowledge, every case in which courts have granted relief under Rule 72(E) involved situations where the movant claimed lack of notice and the order was either never mailed or mailed to the wrong address. See, e.g., Markle, 514 N.E.2d at 614 (the trial court ruled on two separate motions, but the movants received a copy of only one order in the mail, and the evidence could support the conclusion that copies of both orders had not been mailed to the movants); Taylor v. State, 939 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (movant claimed not to receive the order, and the CCS was “riddled with inaccuracies and contradictions” and indicated that the order had been mailed to the wrong address); In re Sale of Real Prop. with Delinquent Taxes or Special Assessments, 822 N.E.2d 1063, 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (copy of the order was not mailed), trans. denied; Gable v. Curtis, 673 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (copy of the order was mailed to the wrong address).
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A copy of the Order was mailed to the office of Atkins’s counsel. It may well be true that her counsel never physically laid eyes on the Order and thus did not have actual knowledge of it. But her counsel’s mishandling of the Order does not negate the fact that notice was given. Because that notice was given, Atkins cannot now obtain relief under Rule 72(E). A contrary result would undermine the purpose of Rule 72(E). See Markle, 514 N.E.2d at 613-14.
Conclusion
We conclude that because lack of notice is a prerequisite to relief under Indiana Trial Rule 72(E) and Atkins had notice of the Order, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Atkins’s request to file a belated appeal. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.