Riley, J.
….
We disagree that I.C. § 33-33-49-32(c) applies under these circumstances and instead conclude that Judge Reid, the special judge, or those judicial officials designated in T.R. 79(I) could preside over the hearing. Trial Rule 79(I) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(2) In the event that a special judge assumes jurisdiction and is thereafter unavailable for any reason on the date when a hearing or trial is scheduled;
a. the special judge may, as appropriate, appoint a judge pro tempore, temporary judge, or senior judge of the court where the case is pending, provided such judge is otherwise eligible to serve and has not previously had jurisdiction of the case removed from them pursuant to the Rules of Trial Procedure, or
b. the regular judge of the court where the case is pending may assume temporary jurisdiction, provided such judge is otherwise eligible to serve and has not previously had jurisdiction of the case removed pursuant to the Rules of Trial Procedure.
T.R. 79(I)(2) (emphasis added). Here, Judge Reid assumed jurisdiction and was unavailable for the December hearing. By the express terms of T.R. 79(I)(2)(a), only a judge pro tempore, temporary judge, a senior judge appointed by Judge Reid could preside under such circumstances. Further, T.R. 79(I)(2)(b) is inapplicable since Judge Reid was the regular judge of Civil Division 14 at the time of hearing. Because a magistrate is not within the class of judicial officers specified in T.R. 79(I)(2), Magistrate Mattingly could not preside at the hearing.
Furthermore, T.R. 79(I) addresses situations where the special judge is unavailable and those judicial officers do not assume jurisdiction. “If the regular judge, judge pro tempore, temporary judge, or senior judge does not assume jurisdiction under this section, such hearing or trial shall be reset to a date when the special judge is available.” T.R. 79(I). Because Judge Reid was unavailable and no judicial officer named in T.R. 79(I)(2) presided in her stead, the matter had to “be reset when the special judge is available.” T.R. 79(I). This did not occur.
However, Mother argues that Father knew that Magistrate Mattingly would preside as early as October 12, 2012 and therefore waived his objection to the magistrate presiding. Because Father objected to Magistrate Mattingly presiding over the case at the first hearing, no further objections were required. See Smith v. Lake Cty., 807 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, the Order is without legal effect. See id. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to permit the parties to select a successor special judge in accordance with the procedures specified in T.R. 79(I)(1).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Father was denied a special judge to preside over the proceedings. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to permit the parties to select a special judge pursuant to T.R. 79(I)(1).
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
KIRSCH, J. and ROBB, C. J. concur.