Brown, J.
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Rickman argues that the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines encourage communication with a child by telephone and mail and that “[t]his is exactly what [he] is requesting if . . . [M.R.] is receptive.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. He contends that “the court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2). He requests that we remand this case to the trial court with instructions that the court conduct an in camera interview and notify the parties of M.R.’s decision as to his desire to have communication with him.
To the extent that Rickman suggests that the trial court did not make the requisite finding under Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2, we observe that the statute governs the modification, denial, and restriction of parenting time rights and provides:
The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.
Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2. The trial court did not make any finding that a restriction on Rickman’s parenting time consisting of telephone and mail contact might endanger M.R.’s physical health or significantly impair his emotional development, as required by Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2.
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We note that absent potential endangerment or significant impairment of the child’s health, safety, or emotional development, the plain language of the Parenting Time Guidelines presumes that the Guidelines would apply in this case. Further, the Indiana Supreme Court has implied that the Parenting Time Guidelines apply when one parent is incarcerated….
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The CCS entry related to the denial of Rickman’s petition states only that the petition was denied without a hearing and that Rickman was incarcerated on child molesting charges. That statement is factual and does not constitute a sufficient written explanation indicating why the petition was denied or whether it was denied pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2, or whether the court considered the Parenting Time Guidelines. In either event, a factual basis and a finding as to potential endangerment of M.R.’s physical health or safety or significant impairment of his emotional development are necessary.
If on remand, the trial court determines the Guidelines to be applicable, it must then proffer an explanation for its departure from the Guidelines. Thus, the trial court must reflect upon the best interests of the child and the possible consequences of its departure from the provisions of Indiana Parenting Time Guideline I(A). Doing so would enable us to thoroughly and appropriately review the trial court’s deviation and the reasons behind it.
Under these circumstances and recognizing that Sheila did not file an appellee’s brief, we remand for the trial court to provide a written explanation for its reasons for denying the petition or to conduct other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Rickman’s petition for modification of visitation and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.