Rucker, J.
In January 1994, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles sent notice to Russell Oney advising him of his status as a habitual traffic violator (“HTV”) and informing Oney that his driving license would be suspended for ten years beginning February 23, 1994. See Ind. Code § 9-30-10-5. This determination was based on: (1) his 1986 conviction in Fayette County for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) as a Class A misdemeanor; . . . . Despite the notice, which Oney subsequently acknowledged receiving, on November 1, 1999 Oney was arrested for OWI and public intoxication. Thereafter he was charged with operating a vehicle while suspended as an HTV, as a Class D felony, operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior OWI offense, as a Class D felony, and public intoxication as a Class B misdemeanor. In July 2002, under terms of a plea agreement, Oney pleaded guilty in the Marion Superior Court to the HTV offense . . . .
In May 2010, Oney filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief in the Fayette Superior Court [footnote omitted] challenging his 1989 OWI conviction on grounds of alleged impropriety on the part of the trial judge2 [2 The judge in question no longer serves as a judicial officer and has since retired from the practice of law.] and the alleged violation of his right to counsel. The record is silent on whether a hearing was conducted on the petition. However, not only did the State not oppose the petition, but also the State entered into a joint “Agreed Entry of Post-Conviction Relief,” . . . . The post-conviction court entered an order declaring in pertinent part:
The Court being duly advised of the ”Agreed Entry of Post Conviction Relief” filed by the parties in this matter (H.I.) and having found the facts agreed to by the parties demonstrate a material error and not simply a procedural error, the Court now finds that the Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be granted.
App. at 64. The post-conviction court vacated the 1989 OWI conviction and ordered it expunged from the records of the BMV.
Armed with the Fayette Superior Court order, Oney then filed in the Marion Superior Court a verified motion to set aside his 2002 guilty plea. The motion essentially recounted the “material error” finding of the Fayette Superior Court and asserted Oney sought relief “because it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice pursuant to I.C. § 35-35-1-4(c) (1), (3), and (5).” App. at 49. After entertaining arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the motion, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered Oney’s conviction and resulting lifetime suspension expunged from his record. On review the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Oney, 974 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Having previously granted transfer we now affirm the judgment of the trial court. Additional facts are set forth below.
. . . .
. . .[State v.] Starks[, 816 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 2004)] confirmed the principle that it is the fact of driving after an HTV suspension has been imposed that is crucial, whether or not that determination is subject to attack. But Starks cannot be read as standing for the proposition that the possibility of relief is forever foreclosed. Instead the Court declared: “[Although] it is not a sufficient basis for relief that the underlying offense has been set aside on procedural grounds” however “[i]f the person successfully demonstrates[] either to the BMV or to the court . . . that a ‘material error’ has occurred then the person is afforded the opportunity to pursue post-conviction relief.” Starks, 816 N.E.2d at 35 (emphasis added). We elaborated: “Only if the underlying offense was not committed . . . is the error ‘material.’”
. . . Oney alleged in pertinent part that while in custody after his arrest counsel recommended that Oney accept a plea agreement; he attempted to do so, however the trial judge rejected the plea because Oney maintained his innocence. Id. at 53. Sometime thereafter, while still in custody, Oney was transported to court, and outside the presence of counsel the trial judge attempted to persuade Oney to enter a guilty plea. Oney refused to change his plea and was ordered back to jail. Id. A jail representative allegedly explained to Oney that the judge would not release Oney until he pleaded guilty. The following day, Oney returned to open court without the presence of counsel and “changed his plea under duress.” Id.
Agreeing that Oney was entitled to have his 1989 OWI conviction set aside, the State did not contest the allegations in his verified petition. And taken as true, the allegations support a conclusion that Oney did not commit the offense to which he pleaded guilty. . . . Here, the judge’s acceptance of the 1989 plea was error. And as the post-conviction court correctly determined the error was material and not simply procedural. Thus, Oney was entitled to seek further relief. “This is not to say however that relief automatically [would] be granted.” Starks, 816 N.E.2d at 35.
In this case, noting the “material error” finding of the post-conviction court, Oney filed his verified motion to set aside his 2002 plea of guilty to operating a motor vehicle while suspended as an HTV. . . . .
We first observe that although the foregoing representations shed further light on the question of whether in 1989 Oney actually committed the offense of OWI, these representations have only an indirect bearing on his 2002 plea of guilty to operating a vehicle while suspended as an HTV. Stated somewhat differently the foregoing representations appear to confirm that the post-conviction court correctly determined that material error occurred with respect to the 1989 OWI conviction. However, this determination merely provided Oney the opportunity to file a petition to set aside the guilty plea in the court where he pleaded guilty to the felony of driving while suspended as an HTV. We repeat for emphasis that only because there was sufficient evidence before the Fayette Superior Court judge to conclude that Oney did not commit the OWI underlying offense, was he then afforded the opportunity to attempt additional relief in the Marion Superior Court. [Footnote omitted.]
A motion to set aside a guilty plea is governed by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4 which provides in pertinent part:
After being sentenced following a plea of guilty . . . the convicted person may not as a matter of right withdraw the plea. However, upon motion of the convicted person, the court shall vacate the judgment and allow the withdrawal whenever the convicted person proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. . . . For purposes of this section, withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever:
. . .
(5) the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable for any other reason.
(emphasis added). In this case it appears that only subparagraph (5) is applicable in assessing whether Oney’s 2002 plea of guilty to driving while suspended as an HTV may be withdrawn and the judgment of conviction vacated on grounds of manifest injustice. [Footnote omitted.] Essentially, the question is whether the conviction was either “void” or “voidable.” This distinction “is no mere semantic quibble.” Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998). While “[a] void judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect,” “a voidable judgment is not a nullity . . . [u]ntil superseded, reversed, or vacated. . . .” Id.
Here Oney’s 2002 plea of guilty as an HTV comported with all the formalities attendant to such pleas. See n.6. Further, Oney qualified as an HTV because he had accumulated at least three OWI convictions within ten years. . . . Thus, it is clear that Oney’s plea was not “void,” that is to say it was not “from its inception, . . . a complete nullity and without legal effect.” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1154. This leaves us with the question of whether the plea and judgment of conviction were “voidable.”
We first acknowledge that as a general proposition, “[a] voidable judgment or order may be attacked only through a direct appeal, whereas a void judgment is subject to direct or collateral attack at any time.” M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). And our courts “have long deemed post-conviction proceedings collateral.” Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ind. 2006) (collecting cases). However, this general proposition precluding collateral review of voidable judgments must yield to the Legislature’s specific directive that, “a motion to vacate judgment and withdraw the plea made under this subsection shall be treated by the court as a petition for postconviction relief,” I.C. § 33-35-1-4(c) (emphasis added); and that “withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice” which includes instances whenever “the plea and judgment of conviction are . . . voidable . . . .” Id.
. . . When the post-conviction court in 2010 vacated the 1989 OWI conviction on grounds of material error, without objection from the State and in fact with its full concurrence, the predicate offense qualifying Oney as an HTV no longer existed. The absence of a predicate offense justifying an HTV determination provided sufficient basis for the trial court here—acting as a post-conviction court—to conclude that the guilty plea and judgment of conviction were voidable. . . . .
. . . Here, other than reciting the relevant statute, the trial court did not expressly declare the basis on which it granted Oney’s motion. However, the only statutory ground available was to “correct a manifest injustice.” And because, as discussed in detail above, “the plea and judgment of conviction [were] . . . voidable” on the basis that the underlying offense was vacated, the State has not carried its burden of demonstrating the trial court clearly erred in granting Oney’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.