Riley, J.
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ISSUE
Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court properly decided it had jurisdiction to enter an educational needs order pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6.
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The record reflects that both children were emancipated on July 1, 2012 by operation of the statute. Although a child support order had been instituted as part of the dissolution decree in 2002, no separate educational needs order had been requested until Mother’s petition of October 17, 2012. When Mother filed her petition for educational expenses, both children had not yet reached twenty-one years of age. Because the trial court had established a duty to support the children in a court order issued prior to July 1, 2012 and the children were younger than twenty-one years of age, Mother was entitled to file her petition for post-educational expenses based on I.C. § 31-16-6-6(a) & (c). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide Mother’s request to institute an order for educational needs.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acquired jurisdiction with respect to Mother’s request for educational expenses following a dissolution of marriage based on I.C. § 31-16-6-6(a) & (c).
Affirmed.
BRADFORD, J. concurs
BROWN, J. concurs in result with separate opinion
BROWN, J., concurring in result
I concur in the result reached by the majority but write separately to fine tune a point and state my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acquired subject matter jurisdiction to decide Mother’s request to institute an order for educational needs based on the amendments to Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6….