Barnes, J.
Recently, in Sanders [v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 2013)], our supreme court highlighted the deference to be given to police officers who have pulled over a vehicle for a perceived violation of Indiana Code Section 9-19-19-4, the Indiana Window Tint Statute. [Footnote omitted.] . . . .
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The defendant in Sanders did not make an argument under the Indiana Constitution. . . . Johnson does make such an argument. The legality of a search or seizure under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution turns on the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Lacey v. State, 946 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Ind. 2011). Although there may be other relevant considerations depending on the circumstances, the reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on a balancing of: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
We will admit that the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that Johnson was committing a traffic violation was not overwhelming. Unlike running a red light or turning without signaling or speeding as measured by a radar gun, there is much subjectivity that goes into deciding whether a window of a moving car is too dark under the Window Tint Statute. And, again, the State does not dispute that the minivan’s windows were factory standard. Still, the degree of suspicion was not non-existent. We also will acknowledge that the State’s interest in enforcing the Window Tint Statute is not an overwhelmingly pressing public safety concern. Again, the red light, failure to signal, and speeding examples are all more inherently dangerous than having overly-tinted windows. Nonetheless, there are legitimate law enforcement and safety interests in prohibiting the operation of vehicles with excessive window tinting, and police officers are entitled to enforce the statute.
Johnson concedes that the degree of intrusion caused by the traffic stop was “not excessively high.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. There is no argument or evidence that Officer Minch unnecessarily extended the length of the traffic stop by conducting a “fishing expedition.” Instead, Officer Minch only asked Johnson for his identification, which revealed that Johnson’s license was suspended and led to his arrest and the discovery of the marijuana. Officers who stop a vehicle for a suspected violation of the Window Tint Statute are permitted to briefly detain a motorist to, among other things, request a driver’s license and vehicle identification and conduct a license plate check. See Herbert v. State, 891 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. Even if the degree of suspicion and needs of law enforcement were not overwhelming in this case, the relative lack of intrusiveness of the traffic stop and Officer Minch’s behavior lead us to conclude that his conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and, therefore, did not violate the Indiana Constitution.
Johnson also makes a statutory argument, which is essentially that the General Assembly could not have intended to permit police officers unbridled discretion to pull over vehicles with legal window tinting on the basis of their own subjective assessment that the tinting is too dark, or that Officer Minch’s testimony that he could not adequately “identify . . . and describe” the occupants of the minivan did not meet the requirements of the Window Tint Statute. Tr. p. 7. We observe, however, that Officer Minch gave very similar testimony in Sanders, which our supreme court deemed adequate to establish reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle.5 We also assume that, when drafting and subsequently recodifying the Window Tint Statute, the General Assembly was well aware of the constitutional principle that police officers are permitted to pull over vehicles upon reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated, and furthermore that “pretextual” stops of vehicles for minor traffic violations do not run afoul of either the United States or Indiana Constitutions. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996); Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 (Ind. 2001). If the General Assembly believes it would be wise to re-write the Window Tint Statute in such a way as to limit police officer authority to pull over vehicles for suspected violations of that law, it could do so. Additionally, the primary check upon potential abuse of the Window Tint Statute as a pretext to conduct traffic stops must lie with trial courts, which are in a position to judge the credibility of police officer testimony regarding the ability to see through a particular vehicle’s window tinting.
CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.