Barnes, J.
When a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, there are two methods for securing his or her presence in Indiana—the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), codified at Indiana Code Section 35-33-10-4, and a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum (“writ”), codified at Indiana Code Section 35-33-10-5. See Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 95 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied. “The decision of whether to use a detainer or a Writ to obtain custody of a prisoner only arises when the prisoner is confined in a federal prison; Writs are not available with respect to prisoners incarcerated or confined in other states.” Id. at 97. There is no statutory mandate obligating the State to file a detainer within a set time frame and, absent the filing of a detainer, the provisions of the IAD are not triggered. Fisher v. State, 933 N.E.2d 526, 529-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Here, the State did not file a detainer. Thus, the IAD and its provisions for discharge do not apply. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Criminal Rule 4 does apply.
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. . . “Indiana has long held that Criminal Rule 4 does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also Fisher, 933 N.E.2d at 529 (relying on Howard to conclude that Criminal Rule 4 did not provide a basis for Fisher’s discharge). Our supreme court has clarified, “the inapplicability of Criminal Rule 4 to defendants in foreign jurisdictions should not extend to defendants who are brought into Indiana under Writs or other forms of temporary custody.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 100.
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Here, . . . the Criminal Rule 4(C) clock began to tick on March 7, 2011, when Spalding was arrested and charged, and Criminal Rule 4 became inapplicable in the Spring or Summer 2011 [when defendant was in federal custody outside Indiana]. [Footnote omitted.] Although the State subsequently attempted to secure Spalding’s presence in Indiana with a writ, he was not returned to Indiana pursuant to the writ. [Footnote omitted.] Therefore, the Sweeney exception, which applied Criminal Rule 4 to defendants who are brought into Indiana under writs or other forms of temporary custody, was not triggered. See Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 100.
Further, although it appears that Spalding was in the Marion County Jail from October 21, 2011 through January 23, 2012, the record indicates that Spalding was there on a federal hold. The federal hold, taken with the State’s assertion that there is no evidence that the State or trial court knew Spalding had been transported, leads us to conclude that Spalding was not in the jurisdiction under the exclusive control of Indiana during this time. [Footnote omitted.] See id. at 100 n.27 (noting “that defendant’s speedy trial rights in Indiana do not commence until he is within the jurisdiction and exclusive control of Indiana authorities.”). Accordingly, when Spalding filed his second motion to dismiss and discharge, he had not yet been returned to the jurisdiction and under the exclusive control of the State of Indiana, and Criminal Rule 4(C) was still inapplicable. [Footnote omitted.]
Spalding urges us to follow McCloud v. State, 959 N.E.2d 879, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, which applied Criminal Rule 4(C) to a defendant who, after being arrested in Indiana, was incarcerated in a federal facility in Oklahoma for ten months before being returned to Indiana. In doing so, the McCloud court relied on Sweeney for the proposition that “where no detainer was filed and the IAD [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] did not apply, the defendant was entitled to the protections of Criminal Rule 4 . . . .” McCloud, 959 N.E.2d at 884. The McCloud court recognized that Sweeney was brought into Indiana on a writ and noted, “we do not believe that the writ was significant or determinative of the Court’s decision that Sweeney was entitled to Criminal Rule 4 protections.” Id. at 884 n.4.
We do not agree with McCloud’s reading of Sweeney. In Sweeney, the court addressed the State’s argument that, even though no detainer had been lodged, the IAD, not Criminal Rule 4(C), applied because the defendant was incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction when the present charges were filed. Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 99. Sweeney clarified prior holdings and observed that the IAD is applicable for purposes of a speedy trial because a detainer has been lodged and not simply because the defendant is in a foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 100. The Sweeney court further explained:
Heflin stated that “it is irrational to extend the application of Criminal Rule 4(B) to a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.” [Heflin v. State, 275 Ind. 197, 201, 416 N.E.2d 121, 124 (1981)] (citing Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 368 N.E.2d 1154 (1977)). However, the inapplicability of Criminal Rule 4 to defendants in foreign jurisdictions should not extend to defendants who are brought into Indiana under Writs or other forms of temporary custody. This court has determined that defendants in Indiana criminal prosecutions have certain speedy trial rights which we have embodied in Criminal Rule 4. Where the legislature has prescribed an alternate set of time deadlines as part of a broader statutory scheme as it has done in the IAD, we properly subordinate Criminal Rule 4 thereto. But where the state elects not to invoke the IAD for purposes of securing a defendant’s presence at trial, it cannot invoke selectively provisions of the IAD that it finds to its liking. Defendant here is entitled to the protections of Criminal Rule 4.
Id. (emphasis added).
We take from Sweeney that, if the State does not lodge a detainer, the IAD does not apply and the State cannot selectively invoke certain provisions of it. Further, if a defendant is brought into Indiana under a writ or other form of temporary custody, Criminal Rule 4 applies. As we read Sweeney, if a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction is not brought into Indiana’s exclusive control, Criminal Rule 4 does not apply even when the State does not lodge a detainer. To the extent McCloud reads Sweeney to hold that Criminal Rule 4 applies whenever the IAD does not, we respectfully disagree.
NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.