Pyle, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The post-dissolution proceedings resulting in this appeal arose between the legislature’s 2012 and 2013 amendments to Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6. In response to the 2012 amendment—which changed the presumptive age for termination of child support from twenty-one to nineteen—Laurie Littke (“Mother”) filed a motion to terminate child support for the parties’ nineteen-year-old child. Immediately thereafter, Richard Littke (“Father”) filed a petition for postsecondary educational expenses for the nineteen-year-old child. Mother then filed a motion to dismiss Father’s petition as untimely pursuant to the legislature’s 2012 amendment to Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6, which the trial court granted.
After Father commenced this appeal of the trial court’s post-dissolution order, the legislature again amended Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6. In the 2013 amendment—which had an emergency retroactive effective date of July 1, 2012—the legislature added subsections to the statute to address a parent’s or child’s ability and the time restrictions for filing a petition for educational needs following the changes enacted in the 2012 Amendment. Because the provisions contained in the 2013 amendment to Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6 specifically allow a parent, who had a child support order issued before July 1, 2012, to file a petition for educational needs until the child becomes twenty-one years old, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Mother’s motion to dismiss Father’s petition for postsecondary educational expenses.
We reverse and remand.
…..
The record before us reveals that there was a child support order issued before July 1, 2012 and that Daughter was less than twenty-one years old at the time Father filed the petition for postsecondary educational expenses. Thus, under the applicable version of Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6, Father’s petition for postsecondary educational expenses was not untimely. See Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6(c). Given the 2013 Amendment to Indiana Code § 31-16-6-6 and the specific facts of this case, we reverse the order dismissing Father’s petition for postsecondary educational expenses as untimely and remand to the trial court to make a determination on the merits of Father’s petition.
Reversed and remanded.
KIRSCH, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.