Brown, J.
Here, we note that the United States Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly recognized the legitimate governmental purpose of prohibiting the mentally ill from possessing firearms. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-627, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-2817 (2008). The purpose of the Act is to provide a mechanism for the State to seize and retain firearms from persons it deems “dangerous,” which as Section 1 describes above, are persons who, due to mental instability, present risk of personal injury to themselves or others, be it imminent or in the future. Accordingly, and giving deference to the legislative decision, we conclude that the Act is rationally calculated to advance this legitimate governmental interest.
Next, we address whether the Act materially burdens a core value. This court has previously recognized “the core value embodied by [Ind. Constitution, Article I,] Section 32 is the right for law-abiding citizens to bear arms for self defense.” . . . .
. . . .
Even were we to deem the magnitude of the impairment as substantial, however, we find that Redington’s challenge fails on the second component; that is, we find that Redington continuing to own firearms threatens to inflict “particularized harm” analogous to tortious injury on readily identifiable private interests. [Footnote omitted.] Indeed, the Act seeks to keep firearms from individuals it deems “dangerous” if and when they present a risk of personal injury to either themselves or other individuals. On that score, we also observe that, as discussed below, the State bears the burden of proving that the individual is “dangerous” by a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-6(a). We therefore conclude that the Act does not place a material burden upon the core value of Redington’s right to defend himself and accordingly that the Act is not unconstitutional as applied to Redington.
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We address whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Redington is dangerous pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(B), and specifically that Redington may present a risk of personal injury to himself or another individual in the future and that he is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief that he has a propensity for emotionally unstable conduct. In this regard, we find that the record is substantial as to both.
The evidence most favorable to the court’s order reveals that Redington was observed by Officer Abram and other officers on the third floor of a parking garage overlooking Kilroy’s, the bar at which Spierer was last seen, and he was peering through a range finder while armed with two loaded handguns. He also had a shotgun in his vehicle along with various rounds of ammunition. Redington informed the officers that he was “looking at or for people and at buildings and at lights” and that he had been traveling to Bloomington for the past several weekends to look for Spierer. Transcript at 31. He asked the officers if they “felt with the firearms that [they] carry on duty . . . in a firefight that we would be able to hit someone from sixty-six yards during and in the mist [sic] of a firefight,” and stated that “he had ranged what would be approximately sixty-six yards from where he . . . was standing . . . [on] the third floor of the parking garage to . . . where you would come around the corner” the officers used to approach. Id. at 32. He specifically noted that he owned a rifle that “he had sighted in at that distance of sixty-six yards” and that “he could shoot accurately at that distance.” Id. at 33-34. These statements alarmed Officer Abram.
After arriving at the police station on August 4, 2012, Redington told Detective Gehlhausen that he had been looking for Lauren Spierer and wanted to avenge her. He also stated that he had dreams about death and told stories including that his father told him that he would see him again after he passed and it came true, that he recalled an incident “about seeing an owl and a black man involved in the Spierer investigation by an ash tree close to Kilroy’s,” and that once, while attending a church in North Carolina, he envisioned that the pastor’s son was committing suicide which turned out to be the case. Id. at 67-68. Detective Gehlhausen asked Redington why he was in Bloomington and Redington specifically responded: “I am in searching of anything I can come up with. Anything. I get kinda weird here, so and I don’t, I don’t allow myself to be limited to the physical. If I get a funny feeling, that’s good enough,” before explaining his obsession with Spierer and his belief that he had met her and Rossman, which Detective Gehlhausen knew to be untrue. . . . .
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Dawn Goodman, the registered nurse assigned to Redington, observed that he “appeared delusional, grandiose, and [] religiously preoccupied,” in that he appeared to be experiencing “a break with . . . reality” and that he claimed “he would know things that would happen beforehand.” Id. at 97-98. In addition to talking about the Spierer investigation, Redington told Goodman that he had an ongoing problem with neighbors running through his home, although his wife had not witnessed this, that he did not feel safe at home, that he saw ghosts, and that he hears a small voice in his head.
Dr. Mayer, the psychiatrist who treated Redington, diagnosed him with a schizotypal personality disorder which “is a consolation of a personality characteristics and traits” and specifically has “a flavor of schizophrenia” and is “characterized by someone who tends to be a loner, tends to have magical or odd type of thoughts” and “to be paranoid and suspicious of the intentions of others.” Id. at 111. Dr. Mayer’s diagnosis was based upon his interactions with Redington as well as speaking with Redington’s wife and another therapist who had examined him. In that regard, Redington’s wife [footnote omitted] informed Dr. Mayer that Redington keeps to himself, is alienated from his family, “had had difficulties being able to go to churches” and has been asked on more than one occasion to leave a church because of his behavior. Id. at 112. She also noted that Redington has been asked multiple times to leave Kilroy’s. She also confirmed that Redington has experienced visual hallucinations during the course of their thirteen-year marriage. Redington also told Dr. Mayer that he would get information from spirits and would have premonitions. Dr. Mayer could not yet rule out the possibility that Redington had a delusional disorder or a paranoid disorder, and he prescribed Redington Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic medication, as treatment.
The police recovered forty-eight firearms from Redington’s residence in which the majority were found in his bedroom, including ten or twelve on the bed and underneath the sheets or tucked underneath the pillows, a few in between the bed and the frame, and another twelve guns underneath the bed. The bedroom also contained several rifle cases, baskets containing handguns, and drawers containing handguns, as well as enough ammunition to probably “fill up the back of a pickup truck.” Id. at 74.
At trial when asked if Redington was potentially dangerous, Dr. Mayer replied:
Everyone can be potentially dangerous. Hum, I think that there were some concerns. I think that since [he] was having visual hallucinations this is a real concern and that since he was being paranoid and had obviously many guns there’s always the concern that he could visually hallucinate or visually have an illusion of distortion of somebody as being really threatening to him and may in an effort to protect himself or his family end up hurting somebody. So there is a concern in that area.
Id. at 115. Dr. Mayer was asked about Redington’s history of sleeping with multiple guns in his bed and he replied:
[I]t shows a difficulty in exercising a good judgment . . . the difficulties in making rational and good decisions appears to be quite distorted and so yes that is a concern. And [he] does have as part of that schizotypal personality disorder diagnosis there is a fair amount of paranoia. I think he is suspicious by nature and so if you combine that with poor judgment you have a dangerous future potential.
Id. at 116. Dr. Mayer testified that it was his “professional opinion that based on all the information that [he had] available to [him] that [Redington] could pose a potential future risk given that he does have paranoid tendencies, visual hallucination, and other symptoms . . . [that] could impair his judgment.” Id. at 123-124.
Finally, we note that Redington testified at the hearing and the court was able to observe him and listen to his testimony. In this regard, we note that the court was able to make these observations of Redington knowing that he had been taking the Zyprexa prescribed by Dr. Mayer since his mental evaluation in Bloomington. . . . .
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the court could have determined by clear and convincing evidence that Redington was dangerous as defined by Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(B), and accordingly it was within its discretion to order the Bloomington Police Department to retain Redington’s firearms pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-47-14-6(b).7
BRADFORD, J., concurs with separate opinion:
I concur with the majority in all respects. However, I write simply to reiterate that while I have the utmost respect for the constitutionally protected right to bear arms, in the instant matter, I believe that the State met its burden of proving that Redington was “dangerous” as defined by Indiana Code section 35-47-14-1.
RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion:
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The State did not produce evidence that would support a finding under I.C. § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(A). Ind. Code § 12-7-2-130 defines “mental illness” as one that “substantially disturbs feelings, thinking, and behavior, and impairs the ability to function.” Although Dr. Mayer testified that Redington has a mental illness, he stated that Redington did not have the “kind of a mental illness” to which I.C. § 12-7-2-130 applies. (Tr. p. 131). Even assuming that Redington had a mental illness under I.C. § 12-7-2-130, additional evidence is required to show that the mental illness “may be controlled by medication” and Redington has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntary and consistent use of the medication while unsupervised. Here, the only evidence regarding such pattern was offered by Redington, who provided receipts for the medication prescribed by Dr. Mayer and testified that he consistently has taken the medication.
The remaining test requires documented evidence giving “rise to a reasonable belief” that Redington has a propensity for violent or emotionally unstable conduct. I.C. § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(B). However, the State’s evidence, though demonstrating that Redington has a mental illness and possesses numerous firearms, does not give rise to a reasonable belief that he has a propensity for violent or emotionally unstable conduct. It is undisputed that Redington broke no law, committed no violent act, responded peacefully when confronted by police officers, and did not threaten to harm himself or anyone else. His comments to the police, though alarming, erratic, and delusional, do not evince violence or emotional instability. Moreover, Redington has never been arrested, has no criminal history, and has been married for 12 years. He is employed as a machinist for a company where he has worked for approximately 35 years. These facts do not show emotional instability.
In light of the statutory requirements and without probative evidence or reasonable inferences satisfying the same, I cannot conclude that the trial court properly found Redington dangerous under I.C. § 35-47-14-1. Under these circumstances, I find the concerns of the California Court of Appeals noteworthy:
Absent assessment and evaluation by trained mental health professionals, the seizure and loss of weapons would depend solely on the necessarily subjective conclusion of law enforcement officers who may or may not have the mental health training and experience otherwise available at a designated mental health facility.
City of San Diego v. Kevin B., 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 450, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the mental health professional who assessed Redington provided testimony establishing that Redington was not dangerous under I.C. § 35-47-14-1 and the State provided no further probative evidence establishing otherwise. I would therefore reverse the trial court.