Brown, J.
The Court is persuaded, I think, that the ten-year sentence, I’m gonna split up this way – and I don’t routinely do this, so – but the Court will order that you serve two years on work release, followed by a year on home detention; and that there’ll be five years then remaining of straight probation.
Transcript at 60. That same day, the court entered its written order of judgment of conviction, consisting of a general form which the court filled out by hand, noting that Hale would be sentenced to ten years suspended including five years of probation for Count II, and, under a section labeled “Other,” noted: “[Hale] to serve two (2) years on work release beginning Nov 28, 2011 at 8:00 am at FCJ followed by 1 year home detention.” [Footnote omitted.] Appellant’s Appendix at 12.
On December 19, 2012, Hale filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . Hale requested that the court “issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing Sheriff of Fulton County, Indiana, Walker Conley, to release [Hale] from the Fulton County Work Release Program,” direct Hale to “communicate with the appropriate Community Corrections Officer to immediately begin service of his one year of In-Home Detention,” and to further apply any additional time served credit to his in-home detention time. Id. at 14.
. . . .
On January 4, 2013, the court entered the following order:
Parties appear for hearing on [Hale’s] Verified Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus. . . . The Court being duly advised finds as follows:
1. The Sentencing Order of November 22, 2011 is clarified by the Court to read two (2) actual years of work release followed by one (1) actual year on home detention as terms and conditions of probation which was the original intent of the Court. If [Hale] is to receive credit time and good time credit the work release would be four (4) years and home detention two (2) years.
2. The Court sentenced [Hale] to a ten (10) year sentence which was suspended and [] placed [Hale] on probation for five (5) years with certain terms and conditions.
3. This sentence complies with the statutory sentence for a Class B felony and with [Hale’s] plea agreement to a Class B felony that had no agreement as to sentence except a six (6) year cap of any executed sentence.
Appellant’s Appendix at 15
. . . .
We first note that here, it appears that a petition for habeas corpus relief was an acceptable vehicle for Hale to bring this challenge. We also note that the Indiana Supreme Court has observed that home detention is not a form of incarceration, and Hale’s petition challenged his continued placement on work release and argued that he should have been transferred to home detention. See Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ind. 2012) (noting that the court credited the defendant for certain days he had spent incarcerated as well as certain days he served on home detention).
Next, we observe that the trial court did not follow the relevant procedures for habeas corpus petitions and, although we find that any procedural error on the court’s part does not affect the eventual outcome of Hale’s challenge, we discuss such procedures more generally. We note that the writ of habeas corpus itself is employed to bring a person before a court, although courts frequently use the term “writ” in reference to orders issued following hearings on petitions for habeas corpus, . . . .
Specifically, Ind. Code § 34-25.5-2-1 allows for applications for writs of habeas corpus. Ind. Code § 34-25.5-2-2(a) provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by” circuit or superior courts of the county in which the person applying for the writ may be restrained, or, if the judges of those courts are absent or unable to hear the application, by any judge of an adjoining circuit. Ind. Code § 34-25.5-2-2(b) provides that “[u]pon application, a writ granted under subsection (a) shall be granted without delay.” [Footnote omitted.] Further, Ind. Code § 34-25.5-2-4 provides that “[t]he writ shall be directed to the office or party restraining the applicant, commanding the party to have the applicant before the court or judge . . . .” [Footnote omitted.] Next, the confining authority files a return stating the cause of restraint and includes a copy of the authority for restraining the person, Ind. Code § 34-25.5-3-5. The court then proceeds with a hearing to determine the cause of the restraint and judge its legality. Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1.
In the instant case, the court held a hearing on the petition filed by Hale and heard the arguments of the parties. Indeed, despite the fact that the court did not issue a writ of habeas corpus, it “proceeded as if it had done so.” Masden v. State, 265 Ind. 428, 432, 355 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1976). As noted above, there was not a disagreement about how many days Hale had served on work release, and the arguments revolved around questions regarding the interpretation of the original sentencing statement which the court examined, whether Hale was entitled to good time credit, the impact any good time credit would have on his aggregate sentence, and how his sentence should be served between work release, home detention, and straight probation. The court ultimately issued its order which neither granted nor denied Hale’s petition – rather, it merely “clarified” Hale’s sentence, which, for reasons discussed below, was improper. However, despite these deficiencies we find no error or defect in the proceedings affecting Hale’s substantial rights.5 Id., 355 N.E.2d at 401. [5 We note that the dissent rests its conclusion on the fact that here “[t]he confining authority did not present a return containing any evidence that would disprove the statements contained in Hale’s verified petition” and that “[a]s such, Hale’s complaint was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to immediate release because he had completed his two-year term of confinement in the work release program.” Infra at 19. However, as the Indiana Supreme Court noted in Masden, “There being no writ in the record, there cannot be a return.” 265 Ind. at 431, 355 N.E.2d at 401; see also Ind. Code § 34-25.5-3-4 (“The sheriff or other person to whom the writ is directed shall return the writ immediately . . . .”) (emphasis added).
We further note that, had the court followed the applicable procedures and issued the writ prior to the hearing, it would have been error for the court to proceed with the hearing in Hale’s absence. Ind. Code § 34-25.5-3-5, the same section governing the return, provides that “[t]he person to whom the writ is directed shall produce the applicant at the hearing unless prevented by sickness or infirmity, which must be shown in the return.” Here, Hale was not produced at the hearing, and the stated reason was that he was at the job site serving his time on work release.]
. . . .
. . . [W]hen Hale filed his verified petition in the Fulton Superior Court, he did so because he was serving his work release in the Fulton County Jail, not because the Fulton Superior Court originally sentenced him. Accordingly, it was only by circumstance that Hale’s habeas petition was before Judge Steele, and to the extent that Judge Steele “clarified” Hale’s sentence based upon his own recollection of what sentence he intended to impose, rather than examining the sentencing order and determining from it whether Hale was being detained illegally, we find that Judge Steele abused his discretion in ruling upon that petition. . . . .
We therefore turn to the trial court’s sentencing order to discern whether Hale’s continued detention in the Fulton County Jail is illegal, and we first address whether the work release and home detention portions of his sentence were to be served as a direct commitment or as conditions of probation. . . . The court . . . wrote: “[Hale] to serve two (2) years on work release beginning Nov 28, 2011 at 8:00 am at FCJ followed by 1 year home detention.” Id. The court did not orally state, nor does the form state, that these terms were to be served as conditions of probation. Thus, Hale was ordered to report to the Fulton County Jail to begin serving his sentence on work release as a direct placement under Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6, and nowhere in the record is the probation department notified to begin oversight of Hale’s sentence on either work release or home detention prior to his discharge from home detention, when he will begin his probationary term.
Having determined that Hale’s work release (as well as his upcoming home detention) term was a direct placement in community corrections, it follows that he is entitled to good time credit. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6(b) (“A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35-50-6.”). This does not lead to the conclusion, however, that Hale is finished with his term of work release and is being detained illegally in the Fulton County Jail.
Again, Hale was sentenced to a term of ten years, all of which were to be served as suspended time. The court ordered that Hale serve his first two years of his term on work release. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-3(a) (“The court may, at the time of sentencing, suspend the sentence and order a person to be placed in a community corrections program . . . .”); Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-2 (“As used in this chapter, ‘community corrections program’ means a program consisting of residential and work release . . . .”). While serving the work release portion of his sentence, Hale is entitled to credit time which is credited against his aggregate suspended term. Put another way, Hale’s sentence is not divided into executed and suspended portions, in which case the credit time accumulated while serving the executed term accrues against that portion and effects an earlier transition to the suspended portion of the sentence. Here, there is a suspended sentence only, and the court established a timeline on how that sentence is to be served. Thus, upon completion of his two years on work release, assuming Hale is not deprived of any credit time, he will have accumulated a total of four years against his ten-year suspended sentence. Hale will then transition to home detention, where he will serve one year and again will be able to earn one year of credit time. Once that portion of his sentence is complete, assuming no deprivation of credit time, Hale will have served a total of six years of his ten-year suspended sentence. He will then be placed on probation for the remainder of his sentence.
RILEY, J., concurs in result.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with separate opinion:
. . . .
In the instant matter, Hale earned credit time while confined in the work release program. Nothing in the record indicates that Hale was placed in any class other than Class I, that he did not exhibit “good behavior” while serving his sentence in the work release program, or that any of his earned credit time was revoked by the restraining authority. As such, Hale was entitled to earn one day of credit for each day served. Pursuant to the above stated authorities and in consideration for fulfilling the purpose of the credit time statutes, I would conclude that the time earned by Hale while confined in the work release program should be applied to the term for which he was ordered to be confined in the work release program. In my view, any other application would be inconsistent with the intent of our legislature.
. . . .
In the instant matter, Hale’s verified petition stated that he had been confined in the work release program for more than one year and that he had earned one day of credit time for each day served. The confining authority did not present a return containing any evidence that would disprove the statements contained in Hale’s verified petition. As such, Hale’s complaint was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to immediate release because he had completed his two-year term of confinement in the work release program. [Footnote omitted.] . . . Because Hale is entitled to immediate release from the work release program, I would conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying Hale’s complaint seeking a writ of habeas corpus, and, accordingly, would reverse the judgment of habeas court.