Massa, J.
In this case, the parties have spent five years disputing an issue which boils down to a seven-dollar fee paid three days late. The trial court found this delinquency fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim. [Footnote omitted.] We reverse.
….
The Millers’ Proposed Complaint Was Timely Filed.
The defendants contend the Millers’ proposed complaint was untimely because, although the Department received the complaint itself before the end of the statutory period, it did not receive the requisite filing and processing fees until April 7, three days after the statutory period ended. Our reading of the relevant statute, however, leads us to the opposite conclusion.
According to the “Statute of Limitations” chapter of our Medical Malpractice Act, “a proposed complaint under IC 34-18-8 is considered filed when a copy of the proposed complaint is delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail to the commissioner.” Ind. Code § 34-18-7-3(b). The Millers’ proposed complaint was mailed by certified mail on March 18, 2008. According to the statute, it is considered filed on that date. The statutory period did not expire until April 4, 2008. Thus, the Millers’ proposed complaint was timely filed with the Department.
Both the overall structure of the MMA and public policy considerations support our conclusion today. First, the filing and processing fees are located in a different chapter of the statute entitled “Commencement of a Medical Malpractice Action.” See Ind. Code § 34-18-8-2 (“The following fees must accompany each proposed complaint filed: (1) A filing fee of five dollars ($5). (2) A processing fee of two dollars ($2) for each additional defendant after the first defendant.”). The language of that provision also suggests that a proposed complaint is considered filed regardless of whether the required fees are submitted with it; the fees “accompany” the filed complaint, but they are not actually part of it. Second, Indiana law has long incorporated a strong preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than disposing of them via procedural technicalities. Deckard v. Adams, 246 Ind. 123, 125, 203 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1965). Accordingly, we have stated that our appellate rules, including filing fees, “exist to facilitate the orderly presentation and disposition of appeals and prevent the confusing and awkward situation of having the trial and appellate courts simultaneously review the correctness of a judgment,” in contrast to the statute of limitations, which is intended “to spare courts from stale claims . . . [and] to insure that parties are given formal and seasonable notice that a claim is being asserted against them.” Boostrom v. Bach, 622 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ind. 1993) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Millers’ claim was not stale; the actual filing of the lawsuit in the Dearborn Superior Court on March 31, 2008, was within the statute of limitations. And as we have said before, “there are numerous methods by which to enforce effectively the payment of filing fees other than by couching such enforcement in jurisdictional terms.” Id. (citing Brady v. E. Ind. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 396 N.E.2d 335, 335 (Ind. 1978)). Therefore, the trial court’s decision to dismiss the Millers’ claims as untimely is inconsistent with the structure of the Act and with our public policy.
Finally, we have resolved the issue on this straightforward statutory ground, so we need not consider the Millers’ alternative arguments that their proposed complaint was filed timely because they (1) mailed the fees on the last day of the statutory period, or (2) mailed the fees within the thirty-day window the Department provided them in its letter.
Conclusion
Ultimately, as we read the statute, it does not mandate that the Millers’ claim is lost for want of this seven-dollar horse-shoe nail.[Footnote omitted.] We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, David, and Rush, JJ., concur.