Baker, J.
In this case, the appellant-defendant Wayne L. Patton challenges a certain condition of probation that the trial court imposed following his conviction for Child Seduction,1 a class D felony. Patton contends that the condition prohibiting him from accessing various internet websites and computer programs in which children are likely to participate is “overly broad, excessively vague,” and impermissibly impinges on his First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Appellant’s Br. p. 4.
A trial court may impose conditions of probation that restrict a defendant’s activities substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions that are imposed upon an individual. The condition that the trial court imposed upon Patton is reasonable and is neither overbroad nor excessively vague because the condition relates directly to preventing Patton from communicating with children on the internet. The condition also specifically informs Patton that he is prohibited from engaging in internet activity that is designed and known to be used by children. As a result, we decline to strike this condition of probation, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. . . .
The trial court informed Patton that he was required to follow all of the special sex offender rules and register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. These conditions included the following:
You are prohibited from accessing or using certain websites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by children. You are prohibited from deleting, erasing, or tampering with information on your personal computer with intent to conceal an activity prohibited by this condition.2 [2 This is a required condition of probation under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-2.2(4).]
. . . .
Although Patton relies on Doe v. Marion County Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 2013), in support of his contention that his First Amendment rights were violated in light of this probation condition, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted Indiana Code section 35-42-4-12, which prohibited certain sex offenders from “knowingly or intentionally us[ing]: a social networking website” or “an instant messaging or chat room program” that “the offender knows allows a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the website or program,” and held that the statute was not “narrowly tailored” because the statute targeted substantially more activity than the evil it sought to address, which was illicit contact with minors. Id. at 699-701.
However, it was expressly acknowledged that this holding “should not be read to affect district courts’ latitude in fashioning terms of supervised release, . . . or states from implementing similar solutions.” Id. at 703. Indeed, the Doe Court recognized that a trial court might constitutionally limit a defendant’s full access to the internet as a term of supervised release if such full access posed too high a risk of recidivism. Id.
In this case, Patton is a sex offender on supervised release that places him in a significantly different position than the class of sex offenders in Doe and renders the holding in that case inapplicable to him. Time and again, we have observed that conditions of probation may impinge upon a probationer’s right to exercise an otherwise constitutionally protected right because “probationers simply do not enjoy the freedoms to which ordinary citizens are entitled. Purdy v. State, 708 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Here, Patton’s internet restriction specifically applies to websites that are “frequented by children.” I.C. § 35-38-2-2.2(4). In our view, this internet restriction while Patton is on probation is reasonably and directly related to deterring Patton from having contact with children and to protecting the public. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “the concomitant dangers of the internet and the need to protect both the public and sex offenders themselves from its potential abuses”). Also, Patton’s internet restriction is tailored to him as a sex offender and serves the legitimate needs of law enforcement to monitor and restrict his activities with children for this initial period following his conviction.
. . . .
Because the condition of probation in this case is specifically tailored to only those internet activities that are “frequented by children,” Patton is provided with adequate notice that he would be in violation of his probation by accessing websites that are designed and known to be used by children for communication. Also, in light of the vast nature of the internet, it would be virtually impossible for the legislature to list each and every website, chat room, or instant messaging program that permits communication by and among children. In short, because the language of the probation condition afforded Patton a predictable standard and notice with regard to his internet usage during his probationary period, his constitutional claims fail, and we decline to set aside the condition of probation that relates to his internet usage.
MAY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.