Najam, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this nonadversarial proceeding, M.F. is the biological father of Infant T. Infant T. was born to S.T., who acted as a surrogate for M.F. and an unknown egg donor. During the pregnancy, M.F., S.T., and S.T.’s husband, C.T., jointly filed an agreed petition with the trial court to establish M.F.’s paternity and to “disestablish” S.T.’s maternity. The trial court denied the agreed petition and certified its order for interlocutory appeal, which we accepted. We address the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied M.F.’s request to establish paternity.
2. Whether a surrogate may petition a court to disestablish maternity.
[Footnote omitted.]
We reverse the trial court’s denial of M.F.’s request to establish paternity, but we affirm the trial court’s denial of S.T.’s request to disestablish maternity. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
….
Thus, we hold that S.T.’s petition to disestablish maternity is not cognizable. It would not be in the best interests of the child, and would be contrary to public policy, to allow the birth mother to have the child declared a child without a mother. And it would be inconsistent to allow for petitions to disestablish maternity when petitions to disestablish paternity are forbidden. If this had been an adversarial proceeding, a party who opposed S.T.’s petition could have filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
However, our holding does not exclude the indirect disestablishment of maternity, such as in Infant R. The indirect disestablishment of maternity requires a putative mother to petition the court for the establishment of maternity and to prove her maternity by clear and convincing evidence, not simply by affidavit or stipulation. Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 61-62. If the putative mother satisfies her burden of proof, the establishment of maternity in her would indirectly disestablish maternity in the birth mother.
But we are not presented with facts demonstrating maternity in any woman other than S.T. Indiana law presumes the birth mother of a child is the child’s biological mother. Id. at 61. “[T]his presumptive relationship will stand unless [another woman] establishes that she is, in fact, the biological mother of [the child].” Id. at 62. No other woman has petitioned the court to establish maternity. As such, the trial court properly dismissed S.T.’s petition to disestablish her maternity.
Conclusion
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied the parties’ petition to establish M.F.’s paternity. However, S.T.’s petition to disestablish maternity is not cognizable and, as such, the trial court properly dismissed that request. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order establishing M.F.’s paternity.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
BAILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.