Dickson, C.J.
Plaintiffs Sharon and Leslie Wright appeal the striking of their expert witness and the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim against Dr. Anthony Miller and Achilles Podiatry Group pursuant to Trial Rules 37(B) and 41(E). We reverse.
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In the present case, we discern from the trial court’s order of judgment and order denying the plaintiffs’ motion to correct error that the court’s decision to dismiss was predicated upon its determination excluding the plaintiffs’ expert witness. It was the court’s decision to exclude the witness that resulted from plaintiffs’ counsel’s persistent disregard and violation of the court’s discovery and case management orders. For this reason, we will first address the propriety of the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert witness. Then we will address the trial court’s resulting dismissal decision.
2. Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness
Applying the above principles, we find that the exclusion of the expert witness was inconsistent with the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. There is no question that the plaintiffs’ counsel failed to include their original expert witness, Dr. Nash, on any witness list. However, it is also clear that the defendants were well aware that the plaintiffs intended Dr. Nash to be the expert witness at trial. See, e.g., Trial Court Order, Aug. 16, 2010, Appellants’ Am. App’x at 308 (vacating trial date and extending discovery) (“The defendants’ position that plaintiffs have failed to formally designate Nash as their expert witness notwithstanding, the Court finds that his testifying at trial was anticipated by both plaintiffs and defendants.”). Furthermore, the delay of the trial was not primarily necessitated by the substandard conduct of the plaintiffs’ counsel, but rather by the unavailability of Dr. Nash due to health concerns, an event presumably beyond the control of the plaintiffs or their counsel.
While we critically view counsel’s haphazard and disrespectful pattern of inattention to or disregard of the trial court’s management and discovery orders and deadlines, the prejudice to the defendants was minimal. They were well aware that the plaintiffs were attempting to secure a new expert witness and that the witness would need to be deposed. As of the date of the status conference, when the plaintiffs’ new expert witness was disclosed, no new trial date had been set. Certainly the trial court would have provided the defendants time to prepare to confront the plaintiffs’ new witness at trial. The late disclosure was thus neither a surprise nor would it have had a deleterious or significantly prejudicial effect on the defendants’ case. The prejudice to the defendants was little greater than that which is to be expected in suits of this nature. In contrast, as demonstrated by the trial court’s conclusion that the exclusion required dismissal, the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert would have had a substantial effect on their ability to present the merits of their case. We find that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert witness was inconsistent with the trial court’s duty to “seek to apply sanctions which have a minimal [e]ffect on the evidence presented at trial and the merits of the case.” Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d at 990; see also Outback Steakhouse, 856 N.E.2d at 82.
We continue to recognize the trial court’s inherent powers in “maintaining its dignity, se-curing obedience to its process and rules, rebuking interference with the conduct of business, and punishing unseemly behavior,” Major, 822 N.E.2d at 169, and we encourage trial judges to actively oversee and manage the cases pending before them. The use and enforcement of case management orders and deadlines are essential to sound judicial administration. But we conclude that the circumstances of the present case warranted some lesser, preliminary, or more pointed sanction fashioned to address counsel’s unsatisfactory conduct in this case without depriving the plaintiffs of their ability to present the merits of their case at trial. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert witness was inconsistent with the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances presented.
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Rucker, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.
David, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
David, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion reversing dismissal of this case pursuant to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. I agree that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the case entirely under the circumstances presented here. I also concur that a formulaic adherence to the factors from Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 1986), diminishes the discretionary authority of the trial court judge to manage and maintain the dignity, business, and process of the court.
Nevertheless, I cannot concur with the subsequent reversal of the trial court’s decision to exclude Wright’s expert witness. Without seeking to enter the unsettled arena of whether such an expert witness is required in this type of case, I not only believe the exclusion was an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion here, but I struggle to find a more appropriate sanction with which the trial court could have enforced its discovery deadlines and orders when Wright repeatedly failed to include Dr. Nash on her witness lists, filed those witness lists late (along with other delayed filings), and then failed to meet a discovery deadline that had already been extended at her request.
While this may not have prejudiced Dr. Miller to the point that dismissal of the action entirely was appropriate, to me it demonstrates a patterned lack of regard for the Trial Rules and the trial court’s authority, much less the successful pursuit of Wright’s own case. Accordingly, I would find no abuse of discretion in striking Wright’s expert witness and therefore respectfully dissent.