Robb, C.J.
Case Summary and Issue
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”), appeals the trial court’s order modifying its mortgage agreement with Jeffery A. Curatolo. We find the following restated issue dispositive: whether the trial court had the authority to modify the mortgage agreement without consent of both parties. Concluding the trial court lacked the authority to do so, we reverse and remand.
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And while the statute gives the trial court the right to stay the foreclosure action pending the negotiation process, Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(b), and the right to issue a provisional order requiring the debtor to continue to make monthly payments if he or she continues to occupy the dwelling while the foreclosure action is pending, Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-8.6(b),nowhere does the statute give a trial court the authority to enter a final order modifying the mortgage agreement. [Footnote omitted.] The fact that the legislature itself could not have impaired the contractual obligations of the parties lends further support to our conclusion it did not intend to give the courts that authority. Because the mortgage agreement was based upon the parties’ mutual assent, they must both agree to any permanent modification. See, e.g., Voigt v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1279-80 (Ind. 1996) (holding that a court lacked the statutory authority to modify a maintenance award based on a settlement agreement where the court had no authority to impose that kind of maintenance award “because the sole authority for the maintenance obligation originally derived from [the parties’] mutual assent”). In fact, the statute sets forth that the “foreclosure action filed by the creditor may proceed as otherwise allowed by law” if “as a result of a settlement conference held under this chapter, the debtor and the creditor are unable to agree on the terms of a foreclosure prevention agreement.” Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-10(f). Thus, the trial court acted in excess of its authority when it ordered the modification.
Nor is this a case where the court was merely interpreting or enforcing a previously entered into agreement. Generally, when interpreting mortgage agreements, courts are bound to give effect to the plain meaning of the language of the mortgage. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Gary v. Stone, 467 N.E.2d 1226, 1233-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied. “It is not within the province of a court to make a new contract for the parties or to ignore or eliminate provisions of the instrument.” Id. at 1234. Curatolo concedes this point and instead argues that the modification was a proper sanction for Nationstar’s misconduct. [Footnote omitted.] Trial courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions on parties and attorneys for “discovery violations, contempt, and the government’s wrongful conduct.” Allied Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that courts have the inherent power to sanction parties for intentionally violating motions in limine and causing a mistrial), trans. denied. The purpose of this power is to protect the integrity of the judicial system and to secure compliance with the court’s rules and orders. Id. at 154. Here, however, the only court orders Nationstar allegedly violated relate to the trial court’s attempts to impose a foreclosure prevention agreement on the parties. As we conclude above, a creditor is under no obligation to enter into a foreclosure prevention agreement with a debtor, ill-advised as its refusal to do so may be. And while the trial court found that Nationstar’s behavior evidenced bad faith, we cannot agree that requesting additional documentation in response to a change of income or requesting an additional $300 per month from Curatolo was bad faith. Curatolo was not entitled to a final foreclosure prevention agreement with terms to his liking. And even if the parties had agreed upon a final agreement, the statute sets forth that the foreclosure shall be dismissed or stayed “[a]t the election of the creditor.” Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-10(e) (emphasis added). In sum, the trial court did not have the authority to modify the mortgage agreement without consent of the parties and we reverse its order doing so and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to allow the foreclosure action to proceed. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
The trial court did not have the authority to permanently modify the mortgage agreement entered into between the parties without their consent. We therefore reverse its order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.