Brown, J.
Christie Wilson appeals the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. Wilson raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found her in contempt. On cross-appeal, the State argues that this court does not have jurisdiction and that this case is moot because Wilson did not timely appeal the trial court’s order granting her immunity. We affirm.
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Ind. Code § 35-37-3-3(a) governs witness immunity and provides that “any evidence the witness gives, or evidence derived from that evidence, may not be used in any criminal proceeding against that witness . . . .” (Emphasis added). [Footnote omitted.] The order granting Wilson immunity states in part:
The Court instructs the witness that any evidence the witness gives, or evidence derived from that evidence, may not be used in a criminal proceeding against the witness, unless the evidence is volunteered by the witness or is not responsive to a question by the prosecuting attorney.
Appellant’s Appendix at 6 (emphasis added). Based upon the language in Ind. Code § 35-37-3-3(a) and the trial court’s order granting immunity, we conclude that Wilson was granted both use immunity and derivative use immunity.
The United States Supreme Court has decided that statutes which compel the testimony of target witnesses in exchange for both use immunity and derivative use immunity are constitutional even when they allow subsequent perjury prosecutions arising from false immunized testimony. In re Caito, 459 N.E.2d at 1183 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972)). In Kastigar, the United States Supreme Court stated:
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being [“]forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of ‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.[’”] Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
406 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1661 (footnote omitted). The Court in Kastigar also held that “immunity from use and derivative use ‘leaves the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege’ in the absence of a grant of immunity.” Id. at 458-459, 92 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 1609-1610 (1964)). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Wilson in contempt on the basis of the Fifth Amendment.
With respect to Wilson’s argument that “under the Indiana Constitution transactional immunity should be the only true protection,” we disagree. In Caito, the appellant had refused to testify claiming his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment as well as Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. 459 N.E.2d at 1181. On appeal, the Court mentioned “[o]ur constitutions,” observed that the Court in Kastigar had held that statutes which compel testimony in exchange for both use immunity and derivative use immunity are constitutional, and concluded that Ind. Code § 35-34-2-8 did not violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. [Footnote omitted.] Id. at 1182-1184. Based upon Caito, which was decided about twenty years ago, we cannot say that the Indiana Constitution requires transactional immunity or that the trial court’s finding of contempt was an abuse of discretion. [Footnote omitted.]
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding of contempt.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.