Baker, J.
In this case, a juvenile entered into a conditional admission agreement pursuant to which she admitted to committing what would have been class A misdemeanor Battery [footnote omitted] if committed by an adult. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a separate delinquency petition. Additionally, if the juvenile did not violate the agreement for ninety days, the remaining delinquency petition would also be dismissed. However, if the juvenile violated the agreement, the juvenile court would determine that the agreement had failed, and her case would proceed immediately to disposition.
Before the ninety days had expired, the juvenile was arrested for what would have been class A misdemeanor battery if committed by an adult. The juvenile court noted that probable cause had been found for the new offense and set the matter for a disposition hearing. Immediately before proceeding to disposition, however, the new delinquency petition was dismissed. Nevertheless, the juvenile court determined that the conditional admission agreement had failed and sentenced the juvenile to formal probation.
On appeal, the juvenile argues that she was denied due process when the juvenile court would not permit her to present evidence regarding probable cause after the new delinquency petition was dismissed. We conclude that before a juvenile court can determine that a conditional admission agreement has failed based upon probable cause that a new offense has been committed, the juvenile court must independently find probable cause instead of merely relying on the probable cause finding that authorized the filing of the delinquency petition. Additionally, a juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the existence of probable cause. Here, because the juvenile court relied solely on the finding of the probable cause that supported the filing of the new delinquency petition, and C.B. was not given a meaningful opportunity to challenge probable cause, we reverse.
RILEY, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurs with separate opinion:
I part with the majority when it says that, “a juvenile court may not rely solely on the fact that there was probable cause to authorize the filing of a delinquency petition” and suggests that a conditional agreement like the one here could never be revoked based only on the filing of another delinquency petition. There are numerous probation revocation cases, which I consider to be analogous to the present situation, establishing that in some cases a probable cause finding in another matter may be used to revoke probation. . . . .