Bradford, J.
The stipulated factual basis entered during the June 19, 2012 guilty plea hearing provides that on October 2, 2011, Guzman was involved in a traffic accident when his vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Bland. Bland died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Her passenger, Austin, was also severely injured. . . . .
. . . On June 19, 2012, Guzman pled guilty to one count of Class C felony reckless homicide. In exchange for Guzman’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Pursuant to the terms of the parties’ plea agreement, sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court.
. . . .
Guzman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution to Austin because Austin was not the victim of the crime to which Guzman pled guilty. In support, Guzman relies on authority suggesting that “a trial court may not order restitution in an amount greater than the sums involved in those crimes to which the defendant actually pleaded guilty.” . . . .
Again, Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a) provides that a court “may … order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime.” “The court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of: … (2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a). “Though ‘victim’ is undefined,” the Indiana Supreme Court has held that a person who suffers “‘loss as a direct and immediate result of the criminal acts of a defendant’” may be considered a victim under Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a). Roach, 695 N.E.2d at 943 (citing Reinbold v. State, 555 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995)).
Here, Austin was clearly a victim of Guzman’s criminal behavior and incurred medical and hospital costs as a result. Guzman does not dispute that Austin was injured as a direct result of the collision between his and Bland’s vehicles or that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. As such, Austin indisputably qualifies as a victim of Guzman’s criminal acts under Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a).
RILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.