Bradford, J.
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Appellants contend that the post-conviction court erred in denying their request for relief because the State violated their rights under the Due Process Clause by its post-conviction loss or destruction of certain evidence. In making this contention, Appellants rely on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Youngblood and Trombetta stand for the proposition that a defendant’s due process rights are violated by the State’s failure to preserve, or the destruction of, evidence prior to trial if the materially exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before the destruction or the evidence was potentially exculpatory and was destroyed in bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-59; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89. However, the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), indicates that an individual does not have a right under the Due Process Clause to access lost or destroyed evidence during post-conviction proceedings.
In Osborne, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. 557 U.S. at 58. The defendant subsequently sought PCR. In his request for relief, the defendant requested certain post-conviction DNA testing. Id. at 59. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a defendant has a right under the Due Process Clause to obtain post-conviction access to the State’s evidence for additional testing. Id. at 61. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant did not have a right to obtain post-conviction access to the State’s trial evidence for additional testing, holding that the Due Process Clause does not require that certain recognized pre-trial rights be extended to protect a defendant’s post-conviction liberty interests. Id. at 72-74. In making this holding, the Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man and that a holding to the contrary would lead to a plethora of questions relating to whether there is a constitutional obligation to preserve certain evidence following trial for potential future testing, and, if so, for how long. Id. at 68, 74.
Here, Appellants argue that their due process rights were violated as a result of the post-conviction loss or destruction of certain DNA evidence. The evidence was available for testing and was tested prior to trial. Appellants had access to the evidence as well as the test results prior to trial, and the results of these tests, which excluded Appellants as potential sources for the DNA, were admitted at trial. In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Osborne, we conclude that, like the defendant in Osborne, Appellants do not have a Due Process right to obtain post-conviction access to the State’s evidence for additional testing. See id. at 72-74.
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RILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.